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Ludger Kühnhardt 
The European Archipelago 
Rebranding the Strategic Significance of EU 
Overseas Countries and Territories 
I. Forming a strategic maritime interest of the EU: 
France takes the lead 
On June 28, 2018, the morning before he attended yet another European 
Council meeting dealing with the highly complex and extensively divisive 
migration agenda and launching an EU intervention initiative, French 
President Emmanuel Macron outlined his view of France as a global 
archipelago. Without really being noticed by German (or outside of France 
any other European) media, he presented the “Overseas Blue Book” (“livre 
bleu outre-mer“) in which the overseas policy of his government is outlined.1 
After several months of consultation with contributions of 26,000 of the 
more than 2.7 million citizens in the French overseas territories and hundreds 
of public workshops, the “Overseas Blue Book” mentions 28 topics 
constituting the French government’s road map on overseas matters.  
 
1  République Française/Assises des outre-mer, Livre Blue Outre-Mer. Version 
intégrale, online at: https://assets.ctfassets.net/xx83r0rav05e/2fFvmCeGTq8sc6 
uwwA4WOa/20e3c42d716f56bfa8e7faa2e2474152/Livre_Bleu_Inte__gral_28JUI
N.pdf; for French media coverage see Outre-mer: un ‚Livre bleu‘ pour définir la 
politique du gouvernement, in: Le Monde, 28 June 2018, online at: Outre-mer: la 
stratégie de Macron pour l’‘archipel France‘, in: Le Monde, 29 June, 2018, online at: 
www.lemonde.fr/politique/article,2018/06/29/outre-mer-la-strategie-de-macron-
pour-l-archipel-france_5323062_823448.html. 
 
 
 Internet resources, last date of access: September 2, 2019. 
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The overarching fundamentals in the eyes of French overseas citizens were 
summarized as follows:  
 Infrastructure 
 Economic development 
 Employment 
 Health 
 Environmental protection 
 Advancing the youth  
 Culture 
 Security 
 Protection of citizens 
The “Overseas Blue Book” underlines essential priorities guiding the 
implementation of future government projects initiated in the French 
overseas territories:  
 Enhancing economic activities in order to develop employment 
locally. 
 Anchoring the overseas territories in their respective region. 
 Supporting green and blue economies.  
 Recognizing the differences among the territories. 
When presenting the “Overseas Blue Book”, President Macron reiterated the 
ambition of his government to pursue project-oriented cooperation, an 
acceleration in implementing what has been identified as necessary, and a 
distinction between short-term crises management and long-term strategy. 
For the French President, the overseas territories are much more than 
“imperial confetti”. President Macron underlined the ambition of France to 
do more and to do better in enhancing a maritime strategy in research and 
innovation aimed at safeguarding the unique biodiversity of France through 
its overseas territories. Maritime France is sixteen times larger than mainland 
France with 97 percent of its maritime territory located overseas. With eleven 
million square kilometers of sea territory and 18,000 kilometers of coastline 
under French sovereignty, France is the second largest maritime territory on 
earth after the United States. As a land power, France is the 41st largest 
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country on earth. As a land-and sea power combined, France is the sixth 
largest among all nations, after Brazil but prior to China and India. As much 
as France is a constitutive part of the European Union, the European Union 
also is what France contributes to its identity and global presence.  
In Papeete on March 1, 2019, the French Minister for Overseas Territories, 
Annick Girardin, repeated the key ideas of the “Overseas Blue Book” while 
addressing the 17th EU-OCT Forum, the annual meeting of the European 
Union with all Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the EU.2 
For some time, media had speculated whether President Macron himself 
would attend the relatively unknown EU-OCT Forum. Consolidating his 
power base at home against the tide of violent-prone, Rousseauist-like 
(“volonté générale“) “Gilets jaunes”, he had to leave yet another chance to 
advance the concept of European sovereignty. Instead, his minister gave a 
more pragmatic statement on mattes of marine protection and biodiversity. 
Personally, President Macron has addressed geostrategic questions of 
maritime security and freedom of navigation on several occasions.3 France, 
as its President sees it, combines sovereign overseas presence and global 
socio-economic responsibility with a resolute geopolitical power projection.   
The strategic return of Europe via France – and to a lesser degree via the 
United Kingdom – to the theatre of Asia-Pacific geopolitics includes a 
rebranding of the region by France and the United Kingdom: For some time, 
both countries talk of the “Indo-Pacific”, primarily in an “unusually firm 
stand on China’s expansion in the South China Sea and elsewhere”.4 Since 
2001, France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy includes annual naval exercises with 
India (“Varuna”). Since 2014, French and British naval vessels regularly 
 
2  The English term “Overseas Countries and Territories” (OCT) corresponds with the 
French “Pays et Territoires d’Outre-Mer” (PTOM) and the German “Überseeische 
Länder und Hoheitsgebiete” (ÜLH). 
3  His visits to French Guiana in October 2017 and to New Caledonia in May 2018, to 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, Saint-Martin and St. Barthélemy in September 2018, and 
to Mayotte and La Réunion in October 2019, but likewise his visits to China in 
January 2018, to India in March 2018, to Australia in May 2018 and to Japan in June 
2019 send a coherent message. 
4  Erik Brattberg, Can France and the UK Pivot to the Pacific?, 5 July 2018, online at: 
www.carnegieendowment.org/2018/07/05/can-france-and-uk-pivot-to-pacific-pub-
76732.  
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patrol the South China Sea as part of the Joint French-British Jeanne d’Arc 
Naval training and patrol task force. More assertive than ever before, the 
French aircraft carrier “Dixmude” travelled through the South China Sea in 
May 2018, challenging China’s claim over the Spratley Islands (named 
Nansha by China) and its understanding of the South China Sea being an 
Chinese inland lake.5 In August 2018, three Rafale fighter jets and other 
French military planes participated in the Australian military exercise “Pitch 
Black” in Darwin, along with several other stops en route to India.6 The 
message from Paris is loud and clear: Unilateral claims to sovereignty in the 
Indo-Pacific – by China or any other country – are not acceptable. The strong 
security partnership of France with Australia and Japan includes a substantial 
supply of arms.7 France supports “Quad” (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), 
a strategic initiative of Australia, Japan, India and the United States based on 
a proposal by Japans Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016. It is the objective 
of “Quad”, as President Macron stated, to avoid a hegemonic order in the 
Indo-Pacific region. After repair work in Toulon, France’s only aircraft 
carrier, the “Charles de Gaulle” was ready to travel to the Pacific in 2019. 
The United Kingdom will follow in 2021 with its newest aircraft carrier, the 
“Queen Elizabeth”, ready to go to Asia in 2021.8 
France definitely sees itself as a Pacific power: More than 500,000 French 
citizens live in the French Pacific territories New Caledonia, French 
Polynesia and Wallis et Futuna. France maintains seven military installations 
 
5  See Till Fähnders, Gegen Hegemonie. Frankreich und Großbritannien engagieren 
sich im Südchinesischen Meer, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 June 2018. 
Later in 2018, the British military ship HMS Albion was brushed off by the Chinese 
navy when traversing the South China Sea near the Paracel Islands. Since the ruling 
of the International Court of Justice in 2016 according to which Chinese claims over 
sovereignty of much of the South China Sea, the disputes over how to balance the 
rising military presence in the region have aggravated. 
6  Armée de l’Air, Pitch Black 2018: des Rafale français s’entraînent en terre 
australienne, 21 August 2018, online at: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/actus-
air/pitch-black-2018-des-rafale-francais-s-entrainent-en-terre-australienne. 
7  Beside producing six atom-driven submarines of the Barracuda class for the French 
army until 2029, France has sold twelve of these submarines to Australia, to be 
built until 2030; see: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 July 2019. 
8  Björn Müller, Europäische Flugzeugträger im Pazifik, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 28 January 2019. 
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in the region with roughly 3,500 military personnel. Thirteen military ships 
are deployed to the region. French Polynesia alone covers a maritime 
territory the size of Europe. France understands its vocation as global, 
supported with military operations in eleven countries. Projecting a global 
presence in the shaping of world affairs and translating global presence into 
a countervailing force against others are inextricably linked elements of 
France’s external policy. Even cruise ship tourism through South Pacific 
waters is an expression of French presence and mission (“savoir vivre”), a 
cultural form of soft power à la française.  
At the center of France’s strategic interest is the demand to maintain freedom 
of navigation across all global sea routes. No rule-based global trade can 
exist without full recognition of freedom of navigation. This French position 
is fully shared by all European trading nations and the European Union at 
large. Already back in 2015, the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, addressed the 
South China Sea agenda at the Shangri La Dialogue, a high-level conference 
on Asian security in Singapore organized by the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS): “[O]ur engagement with Asia goes well beyond 
trade, investment and aid. It is political, it is strategical and it needs to 
develop more also in the security field.”9 The EU Global Strategy of 2016 
describes “principled pragmatism” as the EU’s approach to global security.  
Hence, all related efforts – including the position taken by the French 
President – should be read as pragmatic contributions to a strategic dialogue, 
especially with China in light of maritime disputes in Northeast Asia.10 The 
Asian region is of prime importance for the future of globalization. By 2050, 
fifty percent of the global economy will be produced in Asia, a region that, 
according to the Asian Development Bank, generated sixty percent of the 
 
9  Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the IISS 
Shangri-La Dialogue 2015, Brussels: European External Action Service, 31 May 
2015, online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/ 
6254/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-iiss-shangri-la-
dialogue-2015_en.  
10  See Elena Atanassova-Cornelis/Ramon Pacheco Pardo/Eva Pejosva, Pride and 
prejudice. Maritime disputes in Northeast Asia, Issue Report No. 23, Paris: European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015. 
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global economy in 1700. Today, ninety percent of all global trade takes place 
on the sea routes of the planet, according to the London-based “International 
Chamber of Shipping”.11 The strategic claims of China – including claims 
on atolls in the South China Sea and the projection of China’s trade ambition 
via the “One Belt, One Road” initiative – impact power equations and 
counter-reactions around the Indian and the Pacific Oceans in multiple 
forms. In an unprecedented way, China’s President Xi and United States 
Vice-President Pence clashed at the 2018 APEC Summit in Port Moresby 
over their respective economic policies, regional strategies and political 
systems.12 These disputes were a telling example how regional economic 
cooperation (with APEC, the intergovernmental Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation, as a prime example), regional political integration (the Pacific 
Island Forum and its loyalties across the South Pacific) and geopolitical 
ambitions of external players increasingly overlap and influence each other 
– a phenomenon not only known in the Indo-Pacific region. The European 
Union cannot shy away any longer. Instead of blaming other powers, the EU 
needs to develop its own comprehensive global strategy with a strong 
maritime dimension. 
For France, more than for any other EU member state, safeguarding the well-
being of its citizens in France’s overseas territories and engaging with 
geopolitics in the Pacific are two unalterable sides of the same coin.13 Until 
now, the European Union as a whole is complementing this national French 
strategy with its genuine, yet limited approach towards EU Overseas 
Countries and Territories (OCTs). At the 17th EU-OCT Forum on March 1, 
2019 held in Papeete, EU Commissioner Neven Mimica summarized the 
prevailing EU’s intention and global impact: “As EU outposts in some of the 
 
11  See International Chamber of Shipping, Shaping the future of shipping, online at: 
http://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/shipping-and-world-trade. 
12  See Tom Westbrook, Charlotte Greenfield, Philip Wen, U.S.-China discord 
dominates APEC summit in Papua New Guinea, in: Reuters, 17 November 2018, 
online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apec-summit-malaysia/u-s-china-
discord-dominates-apec-summit-in-papua-new-guinea-idUSKCN1NM009.  
13  See Rudy Bessard/Nathalie Mrgudovic, Horizons régionaux et variations 
océaniennes des territoires français, in: Journal de la Société de Océanistes, no. 140 
(1), 2015, pp. 5-20.  
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remotest parts of the world, the EU Overseas Countries and Territories are 
of strategic importance for our planet's sustainable development and the 
biodiversity conservation in particular. Today we jointly launched new 
programs to tackle climate change, increase people’s living standards and 
create sustainable job opportunities.”14  
The annual EU-OCT Forum is as little known in the EU as anywhere else in 
the world. It is one of the undiscovered instruments of global Europe. Since 
2002, the EU-OCT Forum brings together leaders from all Overseas 
Countries and Territories (OCTs) associated with the European Union, 
representatives of the European Commission, the European Parliament, the 
European Investment Bank and the EU member states to which the OCTs 
belong.15 The EU-OCT Forum is one of three occasions of dialogue between 
the European Union and the overseas countries and territories associated 
with the EU. The other two instances are two to three tripartite meetings per 
year between the European Commission, the overseas countries and 
territories and the respective EU member states to which they belong; and 
partnership working parties in the same format on specific policy matters 
with a focus on discussing technical aspects related to the implementation of 
concrete cooperation projects and programs. The time has come for the 
European Union as a whole, this paper argues, to recognize the strategic 
significance of the overseas and maritime dimension for European 
sovereignty. The time has come to translate French leadership into a 
common, comprehensive and strategic maritime policy of the European 
Union, which makes better use of the Overseas Countries and Territories 
 
14  European Commission. Press release, EU and Overseas Countries and Territories 
boost cooperation at annual Forum with €44 million, Brussels, 1 March 2019, online 
at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1469_en.htm.; for details of the 
environmental challenge and the EU’s engagement in OCTs see Jose de 
Bettencourt/Helena Imminga-Berends, Overseas Countries and Territories: 
Environmental Profiles. Final Report, Brussels: EuropeAid 2015, online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/octs-environmental-profiles-main-
report-012015_en.pdf.     
15  Past EU-OCT Forum meetings took place as follows: Bonaire 2002, Brussels 2003, 
French Polynesia 2005, Brussels 2005, Greenland 2006, Brussels 2007, Cayman 
Islands 2008, Brussels 2010, New Caledonia 2011, Brussels 2012, Greenland 2012, 
Brussels 2013, British Virgin Islands 2015, Brussels 2016, Aruba 2017, Brussels 
2018. The next events are to be held in Brussels 2020 and in Curaçao 2021. 
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belonging to the European family. Time has come to rebrand the strategic 
status of European Overseas Countries and Territories.   
 
Map 1: EU Overseas Countries and Territories, including those belonging to the United 
Kingdom. Copyright: Prospect C&S. 
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II.  EU-OCT reality: Technical association management 
and strategic neglect 
The status of Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) associated with the 
EU is defined by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), Part IV, Article 198-204.16 The associated Overseas Countries and 
Territories are listed in Annex II to the TFEU: Greenland, belonging to the 
Danish Realm/Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Denmark; Aruba, 
Bonaire, Curaçao, Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius belonging to the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands; Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, Saint-Barthélemy, 
French Polynesia, Wallis et Futuna, New Caledonia, and the uninhabited 
French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF) belonging to the French 
Republic; Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, 
Turks and Caicos Islands, Bermuda, Falkland Islands, British Antarctic 
Territory, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Saint Helena, 
British Indian Ocean Territory and Pitcairn belonging to the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  
According to the TFEU, the OCT group comprises of 25 countries and 
territories with a total of 1,126,383 citizens. The result of the 2016 Brexit 
referendum led to the assumption of a significant reduction of OCTs with a 
post-Brexit number of thirteen OCTs left inhabited by a total of 913,224 EU 
citizens.17 Except for three (British Antarctic Territory, South Georgia and 
the South Sandwich Islands, French Southern and Antarctic Lands), OCTs 
are inhabited and organized on the basis of wide-ranging self-rule. However, 
defense and foreign policy matters remain under the control of those EU 
 
16  A comprehensive overview of colonial and post-colonial developments leading to 
the specific role of overseas countries and territories, but also of EU Outermost 
Regions is provided by Daniela Vogt, Die Integration der ultra-peripheren Regionen 
in die Europäische Union. Wandel der europäischen Politik gegenüber den 
überseeischen Besitzungen von Rom (1957) bis Lissabon (2009), Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2011.  
17  For detailed data see Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories of the 
European Union (OCTA), The OCTs, online at: http://www.octassociation.org/-les-
ptom-?lang=en.  
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member states to which the OCTs belong. This group of (mostly) islands18, 
scattered around the world, are similar in some aspects: small population, 
small territory, vulnerable ecological conditions, not very resilient 
economies, but solid structures of rule of law and parliamentary governance. 
In other aspects, the OCTs differ: None of the OCTs belongs directly to the 
EU or the EU Single Market, including the customs union. EU law does not 
apply to OCTs, although OCT citizens are EU citizens, usually without the 
right to participate in EU elections (except for French OCTs). Some OCTs 
use the euro (Saint-Martin, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, the 
French Southern and Antarctic Lands), others the US dollar (Saba, Sint 
Eustatius, Bonaire) or local currencies (florin in Aruba, Antillean guilder in 
Sint Maarten and Curaçao, Change Franc Pacifique (CFP-Franc) in New 
Caledonia, Wallis et Futuna and French Polynesia). 19  The OCTs center 
around huge maritime territories as defined by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which the EU is a 
contracting party.20 OCTs are highly relevant in all matters of maritime 
 
18  Except for French Guiana with its strategic importance as seat of the Kourou Space 
Center and the British and French Antarctic Territories with their potential for 
mining, frozen until 2048 according to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to 
the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol) signed in 1991 by the signatories to the 
original Antarctic Treaty of 1959. 
19  The British Caribbean overseas territories Anguilla and Montserrat use the Eastern 
Caribbean dollar. 
20  According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, maritime 
sovereignty is attributed in the following order: The coastal sea includes 12 nautical 
miles (22.2 kilometers), the connecting zone 24 nautical miles, the exclusive 
economic zone 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf 350 nautical miles. The 
subsequent High Sea is free for the use of all states while all states are obliged to 
protect the High Sea. The European Union as contracting party is full member, along 
with EU member states, of nineteen international maritime organizations: UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea: Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment 
in a Transboundary Context; Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic; Helsinki Commission for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area; Barcelona Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment; UN Food and Agriculture Organization; 
United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks; General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean; International Baltic 
Sea Fishery Commission; Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Living 
Resources; Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals; 
Convention on Biological Diversity; Agreement on the International Dolphin 
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biodiversity and the prospects of the blue economy. However, beyond the 
agenda of sustainability, increasingly geopolitics frames the meaning of the 
OCTs, not the least in light of the emerging role of the Antarctic OCTs 
(which are not permanently populated). 
The association status of overseas territories with the European integration 
project originated in the Rome Treaties (1957). Initially, the concept of 
association included colonies and overseas territories alike. With the 
decolonization of most European colonies and the evolution of the EU-ACP 
relationship, the remaining overseas territories were attached to this new 
political scheme as if they were an uncomfortable appendix. At the time, 
overseas entities still under the sovereignty of EU member states were often 
perceived as somewhat meaningless remnants of the wave of decolonization, 
remaining astonishingly loyal to their European motherlands while being too 
small to become viable independent states. Forcing these places into 
independence was not seen as a good idea, wherever such propositions were 
expressed (e.g. in the case of the Netherlands Antilles by some Dutch 
politicians21). In 1991, the European Council adopted the first Overseas 
Association Decision with genuine terms of reference for the overseas 
 
Conservation Programme; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal; Rotterdam Convention on 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade; Bonn 
Agreement on Action Plan to combat illegal and accidental pollution of the Greater 
North Sea; Convention on Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents; UN 
Convention of Illicit Traffic Narcotic Drugs; UN Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime. As full member the EU is representing itself and all EU member 
states as contracting party to seven international maritime organizations: 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas; Indian Ocean 
Tuna Commission; Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission; South East 
Atlantic Fisheries Organization; Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization; North 
Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization; North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission. See: Michael Emerson et. al., Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global 
Actor. Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy, Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011, pp. 86-88 and pp. 123f.  
21  “Since 1990, successive Dutch governments have accepted the inability to impose 
independence on the islands against their will.” Gert Oostindie, Postcolonial 
sovereignty games with Europe in the margins. The Netherlands, the Antilles, and 
Europe, in: Rebecca Adler-Nissen/Ulrik Pram Gad (eds.), European Integration and 
Postcolonial Sovereignty Games. The EU Overseas Countries and Territories, 
London/New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 205. 
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countries and territories attached to member states of the (then) European 
Community.22  In spite of continuing overlaps with the ACP association 
approach, the overseas countries and territories were considered independent 
actors in a genuine partnership with the European Community, soon to be 
renamed European Union in 1993. By negotiating aid programs with the EU, 
the overseas countries and territories gained a certain actorness.  
In 2001, a new Overseas Association Decision was adopted by the European 
Council.23 This directive initiated the creation of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories Association (OCTA), giving the OCTs a hitherto unknown 
visibility in Brussels. 24  The United Kingdom preferred that the British 
Antarctic Territory, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, along 
with the British Indian Ocean Territory, stayed outside OCTA, although the 
first two of these British overseas territories were explicitly mentioned in the 
list of territories associated with the EU under the Lisbon Treaty. For citizens 
living in British OCTs, the result of the British referendum on EU 
membership on June 23, 2016, triggered immediate concern. Otherwise, EU 
officials, let alone the wider European public hardly took notice of the 
potential impact of Brexit on the association of OCTs with the European 
Union. But, as this analysis shows, it is not Brexit alone which makes a 
strategic overhaul of the very rationale of the OCT association necessary: Up 
until now, the objective of the EU-OCT association has been defined in line 
with the overall mantra of development policy. The Lisbon Treaty (2007, in 
force since 2009) is dominated by the development paradigm when stating 
the purpose of the association as “to promote the economic and social 
 
22  European Economic Community, Council Decision 91/482/EEC of 25 July 1991 on 
the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Economic 
Community, online at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/d8960ad6-4eea-43d5-9df6-ee03e0779554/language-en.  
23  European Union, Council Decision 2001/822/EC of 27 November 2001 on the 
association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Community 
(“Overseas Association Decision”), online at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/ 
publication-detail/-/publication/76959936-3f70-4232-9e8c-b898933c009b.  
24  For details see the OCTA webpage under http://www.octassociation.org/. See also 
Ivan Hruṧkovič, Legal Aspects of the Association of Overseas Countries and 
Territories with the European Union, in: Danube. Law and Economics Review, vol. 
5 (1) 2014, pp. 65-75. 
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development of the OCTs and to establish close economic relations between 
them and the Union as a whole. In accordance with the principles set out in 
the preamble to the Lisbon Treaty, association shall serve primarily to further 
the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and 
territories in order to lead them to the economic, social and cultural 
development to which they aspire” (Article 198 TFEU).25 As noble and 
relevant as this objective is, it is no longer sufficient as the defining frame 
for EU policies. In times of a revival of geopolitics and the need for a 
strategic repositioning of the EU as a global power, OCTs have gained a 
much more important political meaning.  
A 2008 Green Paper of the European Commission on OCTs broadened the 
perspective for the first time.26 It explicitly stated the benefits OCTs bring 
the EU. Aid was no longer the only focus. The subsequent 2013 Overseas 
Association Decision remained “a unilateral beneficial decision offered by 
the member states to these island communities”.27 And yet, it was signed by 
the EU as a whole, thus redefining the sovereignty links between OCTs and 
the respective EU member states to which they belong. The Overseas 
Association Decision adopted in 2013 by the European Council and the 
European Parliament became the guiding framework for aid, trade and 
political relations of the EU with the OCTs for the next years.28 In the words 
of the European Commission, the Overseas Association Decision, a 
 
25  Lisbon Treaty, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Art. 198, 
online at: http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-
functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-4-association-of-the-
overseas-countries-and-territories/486-article-198.html.  
26  European Commission, International Cooperation and Development, Green Paper: 
Future relations between the EU and the Overseas Countries and Territories, 
Brussels, 1 June 2008, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/green-paper-future-
relations-between-eu-and-overseas-countries-and-territories-0_en.  
27  See Ida Hannibal/Kristine Holst/Ulrik Pram Gad/Rebecca Adler-Nissen, European 
Union: Facilitating the OCTs in Brussels, in: Rebecca Adler-Nissen/Ulrik Pram Gad 
(eds.), European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games. The EU Overseas 
Countries and Territories, op. cit., p. 81f. 
28  European Union, Council Decision 2013/755/EU, 25 November 2013 on the 
association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Union 
(‘Overseas Association Decision’), online at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D0755&from=EN.  
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European legal act (directive), “lays down a new articulated and consolidated 
set of rules and procedures governing the political, commercial and financial 
relations between the EU and the OCTs”.29 In reaction to past experiences 
and conceptual transformations, the 2013 Overseas Association Decision 
was said to reflect “a paradigm shift away from the focus on poverty 
reduction to a reciprocal relation focused on cooperation on mutual interests, 
and places special emphasis on priorities which are relevant for the OCTs, 
such as: the enhancement of their competitiveness; the strengthening of their 
resilience and reduction of their vulnerability; and promotion of the 
cooperation between OCTs and their regional, European and international 
partners.”30 In light of the genuine constitutional and strategic situation of 
Greenland, the Overseas Association Decision was complemented by a 
specific 2014 European Council Decision on relations between the European 
Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the 
other.31 
With the 2013 Overseas Association Decision, the EU agreed on detailed 
rules and procedures governing the relationship between the EU and its 
OCTs. EU resources channeled through the European Development Fund 
were made available in support of OCTs. Aid was matched with trade. At 
the core of trade-ties between the EU and all OCTs lies the tariff-free import 
of products from the OCTs into the EU Single Market. According to the 2013 
Overseas Association Decision, the competitiveness of OCTs shall be 
enhanced, thus helping them to develop sustainable and resilient economies 
and to strengthen partnerships in the respective region of each OCT. The 
mechanisms of EU-OCT cooperation were outlined in detail. A one size-fits 
all program could never serve the purposes of all OCTs. As their diversity is 
as startling as their commonalities, individual OCT cooperation programs 
 
29  European Commission, International Cooperation and Development, OCT-EU 
Association, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/overseas-countries-
and-territories-octs/oct-eu-association_en. 
30  Ibid. 
31  European Union, Council Decision 2014/137/EU of 14 March 2014 on relations 
between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of 
Denmark on the other hand, online at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0137&from=EN. 
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had to be organized. The 2013 Overseas Association Decision, like any EU 
directive, is not only a legal instrument of the EU in itself. In unprecedented 
ways, it also triggered legal commentary and interpretation on the EU-OCT 
relationship.32 
 Indicative allocation 10th 
European Development 
Fund (2007-2013) 
Indicative allocation 11th 
European Development 
Fund (2014-2020)  
Territory (Population) 195.00 million 229.5 million 
Aruba (101,484) 8.88 million 13.0 million 
Bonaire (16,000) 3.00 million 3.9 million 
Curaçao (142,180) 11.25 million 16.9 million 
Saba (2,000) 3.00 million 3.5 million 
St. Eustatius (3,700) 2.00 million 2.4 million 
Sint Maarten (50,000)  4.75 million 7.0 million 
New Caledonia (245,580) 19.81 million 29.8 million 
French Polynesia 
(267,000) 
19.79 million 29.9 million 
Wallis et Futuna (13,445) 16.49 million 19.6 million 
Saint-Pierre et Miquelon 
(6,125) 
20.74 million 26.3 million 
Mayotte (212,645) 22.92 million - 
Anguilla (15,962) 11.70 million 14.0 million 
Montserrat (5,000) 15.66 million 18.4 million 
Turks and Caicos (38,435) 11.85 million 14.6 million 
Pitcairn (55) 2.4 million 2.4 million 
Falkland Islands (2,500) 4.13 million 5.9 million 
Saint Helena, Ascension,  
Tristan da Cunha (4,257) 
16.63 million 21.5 million 
 
32  See Dimitry Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas: Outermost Regions, 
Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis, Aalphen aan 
Rijn: Kluwer, 2011; Isabelle Vestris, Le statut des régions ultraperiphériques de 
l’Union européenne, Brussels: Bruylant, 2012; Henri de Waele, Legal Dynamics of 
EU External Relations. Dissecting a Layered Global Player, Berlin: Springer, 2017, 
pp. 134-136.  
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Regional 40.00 million 100.00 million 
Reserve B 15.0 million 21.5 million 
European Investment 
Bank Investment Facility 
30.00 million 5.00 million 
Greenland (56,810) 175.00 million 217.8 million 
Table 1: Contributions for Overseas Countries and Territories through the 10th European 
Development Fund (EDF) (2007-2013) and the 11th European Development Fund (2014-
2020)33. 
On June 4, 2018, the European Commission presented the draft for a new 
Overseas Association Decision.34 It is intended to be in place by January 1, 
2021. The draft was prepared with the explicit intention of the Juncker 
Commission to simplify the legal instruments of the EU. The dedicated small 
OCT unit in the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and 
Development (DEVCO) formulated the text. According to Article 203 of the 
TFEU, the Overseas Association Decision must be adopted with unanimity 
in the Council of the European Union with consultation of the European 
Parliament. Two readings in the European Council were followed by a 
European Parliament resolution adopted on January 31, 2019,35 and a third 
 
33  European Commission, DG International Cooperation and Development, online at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/overseas-countries-and-territories-octs/oct-
eu-association_en.; population figures from: Association of the Overseas Countries 
and Territories of the European Union (OCTA), The OCTs, op.cit.  
34  European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the Association of the 
Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Union including relations 
between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of 
Denmark on the other (‘Overseas Association Decision’), Brussels, June 14, 2018, 
online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018 
-other-territories-decision_en.pdf. Information on the ensuing procedures was 
obtained in an interview at the OCT unit of the European Commission, Brussels, 12 
October 2018 and through subsequent email communications. 
35   European Parliament, Legislative resolution of 31 January 2019 on the proposal for 
a Council Decision on the association of the overseas countries and territories with 
the European Union, including relations between the European Union, on the one 
hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark, on the other (‘Overseas 
Association Decision’) (COM(2018)0461 – C8‑0379/2018 – 2018/0244(CNS)),  
online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0053_EN. 
html. 
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reading in the European Council. According to the original time line of the 
OCT unit in DEVCO, the new Overseas Association Decision was to be 
adopted by the European Council in May 2019. By then, negotiations for the 
EU’s multiannual financial frame for the period 2021-2027 were not yet 
concluded. Nor had Brexit happened. Hence, the finalization of a new 
Overseas Association Decision was postponed. This left more space for a 
principled discussion of its strategic meaning beyond the possible impact of 
Brexit.  
With due respect to the authors and negotiators of the new Overseas 
Association Decision: The proposed new directive is not a strategic 
document but rather a non-political, technical paper. It does not address the 
geopolitical significance of the European overseas countries and territories 
in any reasonable way. It remains silent on the true impact of Brexit on the 
OCT construction. It does not link the future relationship of the European 
Union and its remaining overseas territories to the EU Global Strategy. In 
short: The matter lacks political leadership and guidance at the highest EU 
level producing a clearly strategic mandate for those responsible in drafting 
documents and implementing policies.   
The most meaningful conceptual achievement of the 2018 draft Overseas 
Association Decision is related to internal EU reform efforts regarding the 
future budget of the European Union. With reference to the promise of a 
“Modern Budget for a Union that Protects, Empowers and Defends”, the 
European Commission’s proposal for the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial 
Framework has included a new heading (budget line 6) under its external 
action programs called “Neighborhood and the World”. With its innovative 
proposal for future funding of the OCTs, the European Commission, after 
many years of debating the budgetization of the European Development 
Fund, proposed the inclusion of the European Development Fund under its 
External Action activities. According to the proposal of the Juncker 
Commission, the respective budget line 6 “Neighborhood and the World” 
should not only be relevant for future aid programs under an EU-ACP post-
Cotonou agreement. It should also provide the framework for future EU-
OCT relations. The result of politically complex negotiations on these 
matters in the EU Council remained unclear at the time of writing of this 
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paper. In itself, this important budgetary reform would not constitute a fresh 
strategic look at OCTs. Should it be acceptable to all EU member states it 
would at least support the necessary strategic thinking: Under the proposed 
new budget concept, the European Parliament would gain a stronger 
oversight role in future program activities of the OCTs. This in itself would 
open opportunities for strengthening the focus on the strategic meaning of 
the OCTs. Impressively, the draft Overseas Association Decision has 
earmarked the multiannual budget for OCTs during the period 2021-2027 
with an amount of 500 million euro (compared with 364.5 million euro for 
the period 2014-2020).36 The draft new Overseas Association Decision is 
also a step forward in streamlining the EU’s global presence by proposing to 
fully incorporating Greenland, thus resolving the existing dual structure for 
the legal management of EU-OCT relations (with one directive for OCTs 
and one for Greenland which is no less an OCT than the others named in the 
Lisbon Treaty).  
The European Commission, in the explanation note to the draft Overseas 
Association Decision, rushed to recognize the strategic interests of the EU in 
the Arctic region.37 However, it is surprisingly suboptimal that the draft 
Overseas Association Decision does not remain coherent in referring to the 
strategic meaning of the other OCTs. Instead, the draft Overseas Association 
Decision immediately talks of rather usual objectives, principles and values 
(Article 3). It leaves the term “interests” to a later stage (Article 5), alone to 
describe the association as “framework for policy dialogue and cooperation 
on issues of mutual interest.” These interests are defined around economic, 
climate change and research matters along with mentioning of “Arctic 
issues” – without reference to the Arctic’s strategic relevance, as was done 
in the introductory remarks of the draft.38 Clarity about the EU’s interests in 
the strategic future of the OCTs would read differently. 
 
36  See European Commission, DG International Cooperation and Development, op. cit. 
37  European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the Association of the 
Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Union including relations 
between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of 
Denmark on the other (‘Overseas Association Decision’), Brussels, 14 June 2018, p. 
7. 
38  Ibid., p. 8. 
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Three political bones of contention were explicit in mid-2019: First, 
Denmark, supported by Germany, Sweden and Finland was reluctant to 
merge the Greenland Decision with the new Overseas Association Decision. 
France, supported by the Netherlands, was interested in exactly doing so in 
the hope to use the upgrading of Greenland with its enormous strategic 
significance in the Arctic region as a driver to enhance the EU’s strategic 
interest in French and Dutch overseas territories in the Pacific and in the 
Caribbean. Second, France and the Netherlands were opposing the proposed 
suggestions on streamlining competition law and state aid regulations with 
the overall EU policies, fearing negative implications for the economies of 
their OCTs. Third, Denmark, France and the Netherlands were demanding 
better access for OCTs to EU programs beyond the particular package 
proposed for the OCTs. The European Parliament, in turn, proposed that 
future OCT funding remain autonomous from the proposed linkage to future 
Neighborhood Policy Instruments. At the time of writing, it was unlikely that 
any package solution would emerge before the finalization of the next 
Multiannual Financial Framework of the EU for 2021-2027.  
The 2018 draft directive describes the following core objectives for the EU-
OCT association in the years ahead: “The partner’s recognize each other’s 
rights to determine their sustainable development policies and priorities, to 
establish their own levels of domestic environmental and labor protection, 
and to adopt or modify accordingly the relevant laws and policies, 
consistently with commitment to the internationally recognized standards 
and agreements.” (Article 3, Objectives, principles and values). Greenland is 
mentioned specifically, but only in the context of challenges to education 
quality and capacity-building.39 The draft directive is filled with concerns 
about getting program management right and to avoid any misspending of 
EU taxpayer money. As noble and relevant as these objectives are, they are 
constantly and confusingly mixed up with the thematic substance which the 
EU-OCT relationship wants to advance.  
  
 
39  Ibid., p. 7f. 
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It takes until Article 5 of the draft Overseas Association Directive to find a 
comprehensive list of “mutual interests, complementarity and priorities”: 
“1. The association is the framework for policy dialogue and cooperation on issues of 
mutual interest. 
2. Priority shall be given to cooperation in areas of mutual interest, such as: 
(a)  the economic diversification of OCTs’ economies, including their further integration 
in world and regional economies; in the specific case of Greenland, the need to 
increase the skills of its labor force; 
(b) the promotion of green and blue economy; 
(c)  the sustainable management of natural resources, including the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystem services; 
(d)  climate change mitigation and adaption to the impacts of climate  change; 
(e)  the promotion of disaster risk reduction; 
(f)  the promotion of research, innovation and scientific cooperation activities; 
(g) the promotion of social, cultural and economic exchanges between the OCTs, their 
neighbors and other partners; 
(h)  Artic issues.”40 
Everything is said correctly and yet, nothing is said to strategically frame the 
objectives and interests of the partners in a future EU-OCT association. The 
Overseas Association Decision should be lauded for the emphasis it puts on 
supporting the OCT cooperation with ACP neighbors and related regional 
integration groupings as well as with EU Outermost Regions, wherever this 
applies (Article 7)41. 
After a lengthy elaboration of the structure and mechanisms of the 
cooperation, the “areas of cooperation of sustainable development” (Part II) 
are enumerated:  
 Environmental issues, climate change, oceans and disaster reduction (Chapter 1) 
– includes sustainable management and conversation of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, sustainable forest management, integrated coastal zone 
management, oceans, sustainable water management, waste management, energy, 
raw materials, climate change, disaster risk management; 
  
 
40  Ibid.,p. 8. 
41  Ibid., p. 9. 
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 Accessibility (Chapter 2) – includes maritime transport, air transport, safety and 
security, information and communication technologies services; 
 Research and innovation (Chapter 3); 
 Youth, education, training, health, employment, social security, food safety and 
food security (Chapter 4); 
 Culture and tourism (Chapter 5) – includes cultural exchanges and dialogue, 
audio-visual cooperation, performing arts, protection of cultural heritage and 
historic monuments, tourism; 
 Fight against organized crime (Chapter 6) – includes fight against trafficking in 
human beings, child sexual abuse and sexual exploitation, terrorism and 
corruption.42 
Part III elaborates on “trade and trade related cooperation”. In detail, the 
following headings are included: 
 Arrangements for trade in goods (Title II, Chapter I) – includes free access for 
originating goods, quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect, 
non-discrimination, conditions for movements of waste; 
 Arrangements for trade in services and for establishment (Title II, Chapter II) – 
includes most favorable treatment; 
 Trade and sustainable development (Title III, Chapter 1) – includes environmental 
and climate change standards in trade, labor standards in trade, sustainable trade 
in fisheries products, sustainable timber trade; 
 Other trade related issues (Title III, Chapter 2) – includes currency payments and 
capital movements, competition policies and protection of intellectual property 
rights, technical barriers to trade, consumer policy, consumer health protection; 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures; 
 Monetary and tax matters (Title III, Chapter 3) – includes tax and custom 
arrangements for Union funded contracts; 
 Trade capacity development (Title III, Chapter 4) – includes trade dialogue, 
cooperation and capacity development; 
 Cooperation in the area of financial services and taxation matters (Title III, 
Chapter 5) – includes international standards in financial services.43 
Finally, a lengthy Part IV and Part V deal with the financial mechanisms and 
procedures to generate, spend and evaluate financial resources allocated 
 
42  Ibid., pp. 13-23. 
43  Ibid., pp. 24-35. 
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under the EU budget.44 Due to fear of corruption and embezzlement, every 
detail is outlined, guaranteeing further complaints about bureaucratic red-
tape and excessive oversight procedures so ritualistically attached to the EU. 
In sum: The draft for a new EU Overseas Association Decision gives 
meaning to the EU-OCT association as an important instrument in 
implementing the relevant Sustainable Development Goals. It is a timely 
advancement of past parameters defining the association. The draft directive 
realizes the specific thematic links that have to be enforced between OCTs 
and their respective regional environment. Thus, the draft OCT directive 
anticipated the scenario of Great Britain leaving the EU by way of opening 
options for future enhanced thematic cooperation with British overseas 
territories. Such cooperation should certainly include co-financing of 
Antarctic research and tailor-made arrangements for mutually beneficial 
trade45 and aid activities. It should also upgrade the practically non-existent 
links of the OCTs with the regional groupings in their respective region. 
Finally, it should facilitate cross-regional cooperation beyond the 
bureaucratic definition of regions.  
It is evident that development-related program activities will continue to 
define the politics of the EU-OCT association. However, program-driven 
politics is not equivalent to pursuing a comprehensive strategy. In fact, the 
EU-OCT association lacks such a comprehensive strategy, which would link 
the European Overseas Countries and Territories with the overall ambition 
of the 2016 EU Global Strategy.46 As a geopolitical reality, the European 
Overseas Countries and Territories are both an expression and an instrument 
of global Europe. To reassess and rebrand the EU-OCT association would 
 
44  Ibid., pp. 36-41. 
45  It is indicative that the limited scholarly literature on OCTs is mostly concentrating 
on health, environmental and maritime issues. See, e.g. J. Jones et. al., Epidemology, 
surveillance and control of infectious diseases in European overseas countries and 
territories, in: Eurosurveillance, 2011, online at: www.doi.org/10.2807/ese.16.29. 
 19923-en.   
46  European Union, Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe. A global strategy 
for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, 28 June 2016, online 
at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web. 
pdf. 
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be a highly desirable contribution to an enlightened European self-interest. 
It is both surprising and deplorable that it is not the EU but only some of its 
associated partners in the OCTs that indicate the evident geopolitical 
relevance of OCTs without any tiptoeing: “OCTs are spread across all four 
corners of the Earth,” the program of the Aruba Chairmanship of the 
Association of Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTA) for 2016-2017 
stated, “providing the European Union with its most tangible geostrategic 
dimension.”47 The Aruban government document continued: “In this way the 
OCTs add value and contribute to the development of the EU.”48  
Unfortunately, as Flora Goudappel has assessed with noticeable clarity, the 
set of OCT outposts based on European norms and values “in all corners of 
the world is an element not used enough” by the European Union.49    
With the British referendum on EU membership, the working hypothesis 
emerged that twelve of twenty-five overseas countries and territories would 
leave the association with the EU.50 But it was regrettably superficial to only 
consider this a quantitative matter. In quantitative terms, the OCTs require a 
geostrategic rebranding – Brexit or not.  
 
47  Programme for the Aruba Chairmanship of The Association of the Overseas 
Countries and Territories of the European Union, Aruba: Government of Aruba, 
2016, p. 12.  
48  Ibid.  
49  Flora Goudappel, White paper of the OCTA chair on the Guiding Principles for a 
Future OCT-EU Partnership, Willemstad: University of Curaçao, 2017, p. 29. 
50  The “Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community, as endorsed by leaders at a special meeting of the European Council on 
25 November 2018” explicitly mentions the overseas countries and territories leaving 
the EU with the United Kingdom under Article 3 (1) Territorial Scope (e)  
(p. 9). Article 152 (3) specifically states: “The overseas countries and territories 
referred to in point (e) of Article 3 (1) shall benefit from the 11th EDF until its closure 
and from previous EDFs until their closure“ (p. 260); online at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/759019/25_November_Agreement_on_the_withdrawal_of_the_Unit
ed_Kingdom_of_Great_Britain_and_Northern_Ireland_from_the_European_Union
_and_the_European_Atomic_Energy_Community.pdf.     
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III. The impact of Brexit on British overseas territories  
The very idea of “Brexit” goes beyond the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom from the European Union. The deeper meaning of “Brexit” can be 
understood as the unfinished mental struggle for decolonization in the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Decolonization, first and 
foremost, is a struggle of the mind between those who claim exceptionalism, 
supremacy and control over others and those who understand global human 
and societal relations as based on mutual respect, equality of human dignity, 
reciprocity and and compromise. From this perspective, the struggle for 
Brexit is the expression of an ongoing dispute between British 
exceptionalists and “ordinary” British Europeans. British exceptionalism has 
never really been defeated in the physical wars of decolonization. From the 
secession of the United States of America to the independence of India and 
other colonies across the world, up to the hand-over of Hong Kong to the 
People’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom managed to turn defeat into 
victory. Part of this extraordinary history is related to the global success of 
the English language, nourishing the strategic special relationship between 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America with its roots in World 
War I and, more so, in World War II. The long Elizabethan age – with Queen 
Elizabeth II reigning since 1952 over the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland plus fifteen Commonwealth Realms and as head of the 53-state 
Commonwealth of Nations – has given the British imperial decline a 
continuous touch of success, dignity and serenity.51 The strategic relevance 
of the United Kingdom as one of the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, has supported the self-esteem of British uniqueness. And 
yet, to turn Brexit into the beginning of a new, postmodern “global Britain” 
with a revamped Commonwealth remains an uphill battle, divisive first and 
foremost in the United Kingdom itself.52 The 2016 Brexit referendum did 
 
51  For context see David B. Abernethy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European 
Overseas Empire 1915-1980, Yale: Yale University Press, 2000; John Darwin, 
Unfinished Empire. The Global Expansion of Britain, London: Allen Lane, 2012.  
52  On the aspiration see Peter Marshall, Brexit in its Worldwide Aspect: An 
Opportunity to be Grasped, in: The Round Table. The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 105 (5), 2016, pp. 451-461; Mark Langan, Brexit and 
Trade Ties between Europe and Commonwealth, ibid., pp. 477-487;  
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not resolve the matter. It only brought the identity controversy to center 
stage. The final Brexit decision also does not resolve the deep identity crisis 
in British society. 
Among the neglected aspects of the consequences of Brexit is a set of issues 
related to the Southern hemisphere. The former colonial empires of 
European powers have been subject to several waves of decolonization. The 
intrinsic historic nexus between 20th century decolonization and the 
beginning of European integration is underestimated in historiography.53 No 
less complex were the efforts to relink former colonial possessions under 
new conditions with the processes of European economic integration post-
1945. The two refusals of British membership application by General de 
Gaulle in 1963 and 1967 (“England is not much anymore”) can only be 
understood in light of the long-standing overseas rivalry between France and 
the United Kingdom. Finally, the French gave in: The accession of the 
United Kingdom to the European Economic Communities in 1973 triggered 
a broader system of association mechanisms with overseas territories and 
former dependencies of European powers. Four Lomé Treaties (1975, 1980, 
1985, 1990) and the Cotonou Agreement (2000) paved the way for a solid 
EU framework of development policy towards eighty countries in Africa, the 
Pacific and the Caribbean (ACP). These agreements also reflected historic 
compromises between France and the United Kingdom as global powers.  
  
 
Sophia Price, Brexit, Development Aid, and the Commonwealth, ibid., pp. 499-507; 
David Howell, Brexit, the UK and the Commonwealth: Opportunities and 
Challenges, ibid., pp. 575-576; Kayode Soyinka, UK’s Exit from the EU: 
Consequences for Africa and the Commonwealth, ibid., pp. 587-588. Fact of the 
matter is that more than forty percent of British exports go to the European Union 
while less than ten percent go into one of the many Commonwealth member states, 
which include, after all, such heavyweights as Australia, Canada, Singapore, India 
and South Africa – but also the EU member states of Malta and Cyprus. See: 
Großbritannien umgarnt Commonwealth-Länder, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 17 April 2018. 
53  Rare exceptions: Marie Thérèse Bitsch/Gerard Bossuat (eds.), L’Europe unie 
etl’Afrique. De l’idee d’Eurafrique à la Convention de Lome I, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 
2005; Peo Hansen/Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica. The Untold History of European 
Integration and Colonialism, London/Oxford: Bloomsbury, 2014. 
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It is more than ironic that the 2016 Brexit referendum threatened to unravel 
this tightly knit web of post-colonial relations between the EU and so many 
partner countries in the Southern hemisphere. Immediately following the 
Brexit referendum, negotiations for a follow-up agreement to the Cotonou 
Agreement were in doubt as some key countries, especially in Africa, refused 
to continue the ACP group. Instead, they hoped to go it alone with the United 
Kingdom. In the end, reason prevailed and EU-ACP cooperation will 
continue: Negotiations for a follow-up agreement to the expiring Cotonou 
Agreement started in late 2018.  
Another consequence of the Brexit referendum was the repercussions of the 
referendum result on non-European regional groupings, especially in the 
Caribbean. Since the beginning of Caribbean regional integration, Jamaica 
had been considered a reluctant integrationist. The Brexit referendum in the 
United Kingdom encouraged Jamaican integration-skeptics to reconsider the 
countries’ membership in CARICOM, the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market.54 Eventually, in this case reason also prevailed.55  
For almost 250,000 British citizens living in the United Kingdom Overseas 
Territories (UKOTs), which includes the twelve EU associated territories 
plus Gibraltar, the impact of the Brexit referendum on June 23, 2016, was 
felt immediately and almost physically.56 In spite of being British and as thus 
EU citizens, most British people in British overseas territories were not asked 
their opinion about a matter, which would deprive them of EU citizenship.  
  
 
54  See Patsy Lewis, The Repercussions of Brexit for CARICOM’s cohesion, in: The 
Round Table. The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 105/5 
(2016), pp. 531-542. 
55  Jamaica Prime Minister tables report on CARICOM in House of Representatives, in: 
CARICOM today, 7 February 2018, online at: https://today.caricom.org/ 
2018/02/07/jamaica-prime-minister-tables-report-on-caricom-in-house-of-
representatives/. 
56  See a French article published several days ahead of the Brexit referendum: Brexit: 
Une sortie de l’Union Européenne derait préjudiciable aux territoires ultramarins 
anglophones, in: outremers360°, 23 June 2016, online at: 
http://outremers360.com/politique/brexit-une-sortie-de-lunion-europeenne-serait-
prejudiciable-aux-territoires-ultramarins-anglophones/.  
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Only the citizens of Gibraltar, the only British overseas population being 
fully part of the EU57, were allowed to participate in the Brexit referendum: 
Overwhelmingly (with 96 percent) they voted in favor of remaining in the 
EU. The citizens of Gibraltar have benefitted not only from preferential 
access to the EU Single Market. Gibraltar also has received EU regional 
cohesion funds and EU funds in support of diversifying its job market and 
improving its infrastructure, including for health care, broadband services 
and eco-tourism. 58After the result of the 2016 Brexit referendum, citizens of 
British overseas territories were as worried as people in most member states 
of the British Commonwealth about the long-term effects of Brexit on future 
trade relations with the European Union.59 Citizens in the most vulnerable 
Commonwealth member states were worried the most: e.g. in countries such 
as Lesotho, Fiji or St. Kitts and Nevis, for whom the United Kingdom has 
always been the main, if not only channel to export products into the EU 
Single Market. Unlike British citizens in overseas territories, the perspective 
of a post-Cotonou Agreement provides independent Commonwealth 
member states with new hope.60 Commonwealth ACP states will benefit 
 
57  Article 355 (3) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union stipulates EU 
membership of Gibraltar with the exception of applying EU legislation relating to the 
Single Market, including the Value Added Tax System, the Common Agricultural 
Policy, the common customs territory and the Common Commercial Policy. On a 
daily basis, ten thousand Spaniards cross into Gibraltar for work, and ten million 
visitors enter the British territory as tourists annually via Spain. 
58   See Chris Morris, What will Brexit mean for Britain’s overseas territories?, in: BBC, 
18 February 2018, online at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43126719; 
Ellie Price, Brexit: What happens to Gibraltar after UK leaves the EU? in: BBC, 29 
March 2018, online at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-43586795/brexit-
what-happens-to-gibraltar-after-uk-leaves-eu.  
59  The Commonwealth of Nations includes 53 sovereign member states, including EU 
member states Cyprus, until 1960 a British colony, and Malta, until 1964 a British 
colony. Sixteen sovereign member states of the Commonwealth of Nations constitute 
the Commonwealth Realms, recognizing the British monarch as their Head of State. 
60  These negotiations were ongoing at the time of writing this analysis. For a concise 
analysis and conceptual ideas for the way ahead see Ludger Kühnhardt, Maturing 
beyond Cotonou: Toward an EU-ACP Association Treaty for Development. A 
proposal for reinventing EU relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
Group of States, ZEI Discussion Paper, C 235, Bonn: Zentrum für Europäische 
Integrationsforschung, 2016, 71 pages, online at: www.zei.uni-bonn.de/ 
publikationen/zei-discussion-paper-2. 
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from a new, comprehensive and legally binding agreement with the 
European Union.  
With Brexit taking center stage in British politics, most citizens in British 
Overseas Territories felt badly neglected. In spite of some efforts of the 
British government to reach out to them via the United Kingdom‘s Overseas 
Countries Association (UKOTA), the United Kingdom government was 
criticized by citizens and authorities in overseas territories for a state of 
denial as far as the future of British Overseas Territories and the economic 
well-being of people living in these territories is concerned. Right after the 
referendum results were announced, British overseas territories knew what 
could no longer be relied upon: After the end of the 11th European 
Development Fund in December 2020, they would be excluded from future 
financial contributions from the EU. The multiannual financial planning of 
the EU for 2021-2027 began to take place without them. This affected most 
the three British overseas territories who are and will definitely remain aid-
dependent: Montserrat, Pitcairn and Saint Helena. 
Montserrat, considerably destroyed after a gigantic volcanic eruption in 
2010, had received 18.4 million euro under the 11th European Development 
Fund, fundamental for the basic recovery of the island of 5,000 inhabitants. 
Pitcairn, with 55 only citizens, the smallest of all permanently populated 
overseas territories – and third biggest marine protected area in the world 
following a United Kingdom decision in 2015 – received 2.4 million euro 
through the 11th European Development Fund. The money helped build a 
second jetty to bring cruise ship tourists more easily to the island for several 
hours, one of the very few opportunities for the descendants of the Mutiny 
on the Bounty to sell local handicrafts and earn cash each year. 
Saint Helena scrapped the planned construction of a new hospital which was 
planned with support of 21.5 million euro from the 11th European 
Development Fund right after the British EU referendum in June 2016. 
Instead the hospital in Jamestown, Saint Helena’s capital, got a simple and 
rather superficial face-lift while the final EDF contribution was used to 
accelerate the connection to a new broadband cable. As of 2020, this cable 
will connect Saint Helena with South Africa and South America in the hope 
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of a new lifeline for internet-induced economic activities. Without any doubt, 
Montserrat, Pitcairn and Saint Helena will remain heavily aid-dependent 
beyond 2020.  
During the multiannual financial period 2014-2020 British overseas 
territories received 76.8 million euro via the 11th European Development 
Fund (EDF).61 These contributions were targeted at supporting economic 
diversification, small and medium enterprises, mitigating climate change 
effects and promoting sustainable energy availability. Even OCTs who do 
not receive bilateral British development assistance benefitted from the EU 
package with an explicit regional dimension (i.e. British Virgin Islands and 
Cayman Islands). If Brexit occurred, it was common knowledge that the 
future of financing development and welfare demands in British OCTs 
would depend on London alone: Hence, the British Department for 
International Development promised to cover future development and 
welfare-related financial needs in all British overseas territories post-Brexit.  
For British overseas territories as for all others, an essential benefit of 
association with the European Union has been the ability of overseas 
territories to export tariff-free into the EU Single Market without being 
subject to EU legislation. The British are fittingly known for being resilient 
and pragmatic. They will be quick to reinvent life if necessary – carrying on 
and keeping calm. And yet, the Brexit referendum has made life 
opportunities in several British overseas territories complicated beyond 
means. UK overseas territories share one critical trade matter with the 
English speaking member states of the ACP group: The complicated ‘rules 
of origin’ as defined by the Cotonou Agreement and the 2013 EU’s Overseas 
Association Decision62 which affect a wide range of processed food and 
goods across British overseas territories. In the past, Falkland Islands 
businesses used Bulgarian and Czech tanneries to process wool whose 
 
61 For details of EU programs under the 11th European Development Fund see the 
website of the European Commission, DG International Cooperation and 
Development, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/overseas-countries-
and-territories-octs/oct-eu-association_en. 
62  European Union, Council Decision 2013/755/EU, 25 November 2013 on the 
association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Union 
(‘Overseas Association Decision’), op. cit. 
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products were eventually sold across the EU. In doing so, rules of origin and 
phytosanitary standards within the EU were met. This avenue may continue 
after Brexit, as in this case the arrangement is permissible under WTO rules. 
But the biggest challenge for the Falklands Islands, as well as for other 
British overseas territories, was the uncertainty about future duty-free access 
for fish, meat – and where it applies, other agricultural products – to the 
Single Market. Following the Brexit referendum, creative entrepreneurs in 
the Falkland Islands began to explore avenues to sell halal lamb to Arab 
countries. For this purpose, they even favored the opening of a mosque in 
Port Stanley, where Christian churches no longer attract many churchgoers. 
Organizing religious conditions in line with halal slaughtering procedures 
might be easier than redirecting fish exports for the Falklands.  
Over years, the EU has developed to be the largest market for fish (and in 
the case of the Falkland Islands also for meat) for some of the British 
overseas territories. The bulk of Saint Helena’s annual tuna fish export of 
around 120 tons (one cargo container per month) goes to the European Union 
via a South African port. Tristan da Cunha, one of the other two islands in 
the South Atlantic administered by the British governor in Saint Helena, has 
worked hard for years to gain access for its lobster to the EU market. 
Eventually, the fishermen on this island of 300 citizens succeeded. But, they 
questioned what would happen if Brexit brings higher tariffs, possibly 
eliminating a big share of the annual turnover which is limited in Saint 
Helena and Tristan da Cunha? Falkland fish and meat exports amount to 
around 200 million euro turn-over per year, a true bonanza for this South 
Atlantic fishing industry. The EU27, according to statistics of the Falkland 
government, is “destination for 94% of the Falkland Island’s exports of 
fishery products, by weight.” 63 Fish and meat exports amount on average 
(statistics for the period 2007-2015) to 43 percent of the GDP of the Falkland 
Islands. 64  As the Falklands Islands are not included under the WTO 
membership of the United Kingdom, at best the Most Favored Nations tariffs 
 
63  Richard Hyslop, Potential longer-term impact of Brexit on the Falkland Islands main 
exports to the EU, Port Stanley: Falkland Islands Government, Policy and Economic 
Development Directorate, 2018, p. 2.  
64  Ibid., p. 3. 
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clause could apply to their export industries without tariff-free access to the 
EU market – provided a comprehensive EU-United Kingdom deal comes 
about. Falkland squid, like Saint Helena tuna, could face tariffs of up to 20 
percent. In such a post-Brexit scenario, the Falkland Islands fishery industry 
was estimated to face revenue losses of 12 percent (equivalent of 6 to 22 
million British pounds) annually, with effects on employment and 
government revenues amounting to 3 to 13 percent.65 The arrangements the 
Falkland Islands fishing industry has developed with Spanish companies in 
order to enter into the EU and process their fish products via Spain are telling 
examples of globalization success under conditions of strict regional (EU) 
regulatory governance. Saint Helena’s fishery industry falls under the same 
category. The difficulties to secure new investments for a modernized 
processing factory and a possible increase in the small fishing fleet off the 
coast of Saint Helena remains doubtful. The long shadow of Brexit will not 
disappear quickly over British South Atlantic territories. 66  It was not 
surprising that matters of fishing rights were among the most hotly disputed 
issues in EU-United Kingdom negotiations for a Brexit deal between 2016 
and 2018 – in both directions. One third of the fishing rights of EU member 
states are assigned in British waters. 67  In the aftermath of the Brexit 
referendum, service providers’ fear of Brexit consequences in British 
overseas territories was mixed. Bermuda, for instance, has developed a stable 
niche economy in providing a service industry for re-insurance companies 
operating in the EU Single Market. Bermuda-based operations account for 
forty percent of the European property catastrophe reinsurance market. The 
total amount of services exported into the EU amounts to 21.7 billion euro.68 
 
65  Ibid., p. 2 and p. 10. 
66  Because of the sovereignty disputes over Falkland Islands, no comprehensive fishing 
regulatory mechanism has been developed in the South West Atlantic similar to 
existing schemes in other oceans – another liability for Falkland Islands fishing 
industry and their EU partners.  
67  See Michael Stabenow, Begehrte Fanggründe, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
24 November 2018. 
68  According to Serge Zobéide, Caraïbe-Brexit: les territoires d’outre-mer britanniques 
s’interrogent, in: la 1ere Martinique1, 19 November 2016, online at: 
https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/martinique/caraibe-brexit-territoires-outre-mer-
britanniques-s-interrogent-418353.html.  
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The rigid EU prudential regulatory system has granted Bermuda equivalence 
(Solvency II) which makes Bermuda in fact part of the EU Single Market 
“without complying with all EU rules”. 69  Informed observers were 
cautiously optimistic Bermuda could continue to benefit from an 
arrangement labelled “passport regime2” (by which Bermuda could deal 
with the EU27 directly) because of mutual post-Brexit interests. Nothing was 
certain without a comprehensive EU-United Kingdom trade deal, a never-
ending story in 2018 and 2019.  
Less certain was a post-Brexit future for those British overseas territories 
depending on service industries (e.g. luxury tourism), yet also have 
development needs and an urgency to enhance global visibility. Such is the 
situation for Anguilla and for Turks and Caicos. EU funding was made 
available in the past for these territories, mainly under joint thematic and 
regional programs. Environmental issues, related to marine biodiversity and 
ecosystem management, matters related to mitigating climate change, 
programs enhancing sustainable energy and reducing disaster risks were 
covered under the 11th European Development Fund by a regional package 
for the Caribbean OCTs in the amount of 40 million euro. For Turks and 
Caicos, the ability to chair the Overseas Countries and Territories 
Association (OCTA) in 2017-2018 was highly relevant as a tool to enhance 
global visibility, so much so that the Premier of Turks and Caicos revised an 
earlier decision to reject further EU funding for education sector reforms.70 
In recent years, a third of Anguilla’s budget has come from the EU. The 
island of 15,000 people borders the EU and is completely dependent on 
importing all commodities for daily life via the EU outposts of France and 
the Netherlands: the ports on the French and Dutch territories of Saint-
Martin/Sint Maarten and the international airport in Sint Maarten, four miles 
 
69  Peter Clegg, Brexit and the Overseas Territories: Repercussions for the Periphery, 
in: The Round Table. The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, vol.105/5 
(2016), p. 546. 
70  See Caribian News Now, Turks and Caicos premier accused of flip-flopping at 
OCTA forum, in: Caribbean News, 25 February 2017, online at: 
https://www.caribbeannewsnow.com /2017/02/25/turks-and-caicos-premier-
accused-of-flip-flopping-at-octa-forum/. 
The European Archipelago. Rebranding the Strategic Significance of 
EU Overseas Countries and Territories 
 
33 
 
away, are Anguillans only gateways to the world.71 An Anguilla government 
report sent an SOS message in 2017, recalling the strategic importance of the 
island as a gateway to the Panama Canal with twenty percent of the world’s 
shipping passing through Anguilla’s waters.72 In private conversation and 
undisclosed concept papers, Anguillan officials reflected on the post-Brexit 
possibility of becoming a “direct EU colony or dependency” – something 
unheard of in centuries. An arrangement for a common travel area with the 
EU will be the minimum solution to guarantee the future of Anguilla. 
For years, British Caribbean territories benefitting from offshore financial 
services have been subject to robust pressure from the EU to advance 
transparency and legal cooperation in the fight against tax evasion and 
organized crime, especially money laundering. The Cayman Islands have 
developed into the fifth biggest financial service center on earth with good 
access via London and Miami. Both cities are also the gateway for the British 
Virgin Islands.73 Initially, the perspective of quitting the rigid EU regulatory 
banking mechanisms following Brexit was received with joy in the financial 
sector of the British territories: In 2017 alone, 32,000 new companies 
registered in the British Virgin Islands, exempted from corporate tax in the 
territory of 9,000 citizens.74 The decision, however, of the British House of 
Common – against the will of Theresa May’s government – to introduce 
transparent company registers by the end of 2020 has led to an unprecedented 
 
71  See Chris Morris, What will Brexit mean for Britain’s overseas territories?, in: BBC, 
18 February 2018, op. cit. 
72  The Government of Anguilla London Office, Anguilla & Brexit. Britain’s forgotten 
EU border, London: The Representative of the Government of Anguilla and The 
West India Committee, 2017, online at: https://westindiacommittee.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/The-White-Paper-on-Anguilla-and-Brexit-1.pdf., p. 3.  
73  On the legal and political complexity of relations with the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland see William Vlcek, Sovereignty games and global 
finances. The Cayman Islands, in: Rebecca Adler-Nissen/Ulrik Pram Gad (eds.), 
European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games. The EU Overseas 
Countries and Territories, op. cit., pp. 115-129; Bill Maurer, Jurisdiction in dialect. 
Sovereignty games in the British Virgin Islands, in: Rebecca Adler-Nissen/Ulrik 
Pram Gad (eds.), European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games. The EU 
Overseas Countries and Territories, op. cit., pp. 130-149. 
74  Steueroasen müssen ihre Geheimnisse lüften, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 
May 2018. 
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outcry in the overseas territories: The Prime Minister of the Cayman Islands 
threatened to question the longer term membership of his territory in the 
British family. Independence could become an option for Cayman Islands.75 
Surprisingly, the assumption that British rule of law would be the main 
competitive advantage for the success of the financial service sector has 
become a matter of debate since the Brexit referendum. As many investors 
in the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands come from newly 
emerging markets – especially from China and Russia – global power shifts 
might sooner or later resonate in sovereignty debates in some Caribbean 
British territories.  
Elsewhere, the sovereignty issue has returned to center stage in more 
consequential ways. One should not be surprised if the long forgotten UN 
“Committee of 24” – which, for instance, so far does not include the Chagos 
Archipelago (the traditional name for the British Indian Ocean Territory) as 
one of the “non-self-governing territories” under its supervision 76 – might 
receive a new workload. With the 2016 Brexit referendum, across the global 
South – and not only in the Caribbean basin – the overall geopolitical 
landscape has brought back sovereignty matters sometimes dating back to 
the 18th century, when British, French, Dutch, Danish and Swedish interests 
continuously clashed in the Caribbean. Most often the remaining territorial 
issues of “non-self-governing territories” have been frozen during the second 
half of the 20th century: This is explicitly the case for the “unincorporated” 
US overseas territories Puerto Rico77, Guam, American Samoa and the US 
 
75  Ibid. 
76   “The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples (also 
known as the Special Committee on decolonization or C-24), the United Nations 
entity exclusively devoted to the issue of decolonization, was established in 1961 by 
the General Assembly with the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the 
Declaration (General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960)”, 
online at: www.un.org/en/decolonization/specialcommittee.shtml. 
77  e.g. Efraín Vázquez Vera, Puerto Rico: ¿transición pacífica a la soberanía?, in: 
Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, vol. 15, no. 4 (2015), pp. 76-82; Puerto Rico’s 
Catholic Archbishop Roberto Gonzalez Nieves has joined the chorus of those 
demanding sovereignty, bringing the case to the US Supreme Court: Colony or 
Commonwealth? Puerto Rico Status Argued at US Supreme Court, in: America. The 
National Catholic Magazine, 19 January 2016, online at: www.americamagazine.org 
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Virgin Islands; and for the freely associated Realm of New Zealand 
territories Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau. In the future, the Falklands 
Islands and Gibraltar, but over time also Pitcairn and Saint Helena might also 
face the return of the sovereignty issue. But first and foremost, the 2016 
Brexit referendum has accelerated the return of the issue of sovereignty and 
self-rule in one particularly sensitive case: The British Indian Overseas 
Territory, also known as the Chagos Archipelago.  
Diego Garcia, the core atoll of the British Indian Ocean Territory, is 
primarily known as an aircraft carrier, used by the United States and the 
United Kingdom for their operations into Afghanistan and Iraq in recent 
years. The historical name of Diego Garcia is Chagos Archipelago. 
Originally, these 55 atoll islands were united with Mauritius, prior to British 
policies of divide and rule in 1965. In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, the 
status of the Chagos Archipelago has returned as a dispute over an 
unresolved issue of decolonization. Surprisingly detailed, the 2016 Summit 
of the ACP Group of States explicitly referred to the islands under their 
traditional, pre-colonial name – Chagos Archipelago – defining them as an 
unresolved matter of urgent decolonization. 78  In June 2017, the United 
Nations General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution, tabled by 
Mauritius, seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of 
 
/issue/colony-or-commonwealth-puerto-rico-status-argued-us-supreme-court. The 
Court’s ruling has not laid the case to rest – just the opposite, see: Richard Wolf, 
Puerto Rico not sovereign, Supreme Court says, in: USA TODAY, 9 June 2016, 
online at: http://www.usatoday.com/ story/news/politics/2016/06/09/supreme-court-
puerto-rico-independent-sovereign/ 85155382/. Puerto Rico continuously makes 
headlines with its lack of economic competitiveness and high degree of indebtedness, 
which confronts the US administration with bail-out requirements.   
78  The “Port Moresby Declaration – Declaration of the 8th Summit of ACP Heads of 
State and Government of the ACP Group of States” from June 1, 2016 (shortly before 
the Brexit referendum) reads as follows under Article 21: “We recognise that the 
Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, which was unlawfully excised by the 
former colonial power from the territory of Mauritius prior to its independence in 
violation of international law and UN Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 
and 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965, forms an integral part of the territory of the 
Republic of Mauritius and are resolved to support Mauritius in its efforts to 
effectively exercise its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago”, online at: 
www.acp.int/content/declaration-8th-summit-acp-heads-state-and-government-acp-
group-states. 
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Justice (ICJ) in The Hague on the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago. 
Most EU member states abstained, leaving the United Kingdom pretty 
surprised, to say the least.79 In the same year, Great Britain lost its seat of a 
judge on the International Court of Justice for the first time since 1945 when 
the British candidate was defeated by an Indian judge in the UN General 
Assembly and withdrew prior to the subsequent UN Security Council vote 
on the matter. In September 2018, a lengthy hearing on the Chagos 
Archipelago matter took place at the ICJ. The case: Mauritius vs. United 
Kingdom. 80  On February 25, 2019, the International Court of Justice 
published the Advisory Opinion on the matter: “The Court having found that 
the decolonization of Mauritius was not conducted in a manner consistent 
with the right of peoples to self-determination, it follows that the United 
Kingdom’s continued administration of the Chagos Archipelago constitutes 
a wrongful act entailing the international responsibility of that State.” And: 
“Accordingly, the United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring an end to 
its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible, thereby 
enabling Mauritius to complete the decolonization of its territory in a manner 
consistent with the right of peoples to self-determination.”81 This humiliation 
for Great Britain was just the beginning: On May 22, 2019 by an 
unprecedented majority of 116 to 6 with 56 countries abstaining, the United 
Nations General Assembly voted “in support of a motion setting a six-month 
deadline for Britain to withdraw from the Chagos island chain and for the 
islands to be reunited with neighboring Mauritius”. 82The “Guardian” titled 
its report in dramatic terms: “UK suffers crushing defeat in UN vote on 
 
79  See Owen Bowcott, EU members abstain as Britain defeated in UN vote on Chagos 
Islands, in: The Guardian, 23 June 2017, online at: www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2017/jun/22/un-vote-backing-chagos-islands-a-blow-for-uk. 
80  Roland Oliphant, International Court of Justice begins hearing on Britain’s 
separation of Chagos islands from Mauritius, in: The Telegraph, 3 September 2018, 
online at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/03/mauritius-disputes-uk-
acquisition-chagos-islands-international/.    
81  International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the separation of the Chagos 
Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, The Hague, 25 February 2019, online at: 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/169/169-20190225-01-00-EN.pdf.    
82  Owen Bowcett/Julian Borger, UK suffers a crushing defeat in UN vote on Chagos 
Islands, in: The Guardian, 22 May 2019, online at: https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2019/may/22/uk-suffers-crushing-defeat-un-vote-chagos-islands.  
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Chagos Islands”. While only the United States, Israel, Hungary, Australia 
and the Maldives backed the British position, Austria, Greece, Ireland, 
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland were among the countries voting in favor of 
the Mauritius motion, while France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Poland and Romania were among those countries who abstained. While the 
UN vote was non-binding, “the strategic consequence of the Diego Garcia 
dispute” was undeniable “at a time when the Royal British Navy has begun 
conducting freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea…in a 
time of great power contestation.”83 
“Global Britain” did not seem to become what Brexiteers had in mind when 
they were advocating to leave the EU. The EU’s solidarity umbrella has 
already been increasingly porous before the British withdrawal from the EU 
even happened. One may only speculate on further long-term consequences, 
especially in the context of the dispute over sovereignty in the Falkland 
Islands. The Falkland Islands’ government, more than anybody else, is 
concerned that EU solidarity in support of the British sovereignty claim over 
the strategically important territories in the South Atlantic might vanish 
sooner rather than later. China’s aggressive fishery expansion in the 
uncharted waters around the Falkland Islands and Argentina’s incessant 
claims of sovereignty over what they call Malvinas requires European 
strength and unanimity. Concerns are justified that some EU member states 
might shift loyalty from the United Kingdom to Argentina’s position on the 
matter. France, Spain, Italy and Portugal are mentioned in the Falkland 
Islands as possible candidates for a shift of position driven by calculated 
interests placing good relations with Argentina and other Latin American 
countries first. Moreover, in the French language, the Falkland Islands were 
always known as “les Malouines”: The first settlers, after all, came from St. 
Malo, giving the South Atlantic islands its historical name.  
As for now, it is only a matter of speculation whether and to which degree 
linkages might arise between the Falkland/Malvinas issue and future 
disputes over Gibraltar sovereignty. In the Brexit negotiation mandate which 
 
83  Bec Strating, The Strategic Consequence of the Diego Garcia Dispute, in: The 
Maritime Executive, 28 March 2019, online at: https://www.maritime-
executive.com/editorials/the-strategic-consequence-of-the-diego-garcia-dispute.   
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the European Council agreed upon in 2016, Spain was granted an explicit 
individual veto right by the other EU member states to any Brexit 
arrangement should it not comply with Spain’s expectations regarding the 
future relationship between Spain and Gibraltar: Thorny issues on the 
Gibraltar airport, on taxes, smuggling and workers have been well known for 
a long time.84 Although last-minute negotiations led to an approval of the 
“EU-United Kingdom Withdrawal Treaty” by Spain, the simple and most 
obvious solution, to give Gibraltar membership in the EU customs union and 
single market, did not materialize. Hence, the Gibraltar sovereignty matter 
remains a potential bone of contention.  
Since Spain ceded Gibraltar to the United Kingdom in the Treaty of Utrecht 
(1713) under Article X, ending the War of Spanish Succession, the dispute 
had never been fully resolved. But, all in all, since the United Kingdom 
joined the EU, a comfortable cohabitation between Spain, the United 
Kingdom and Gibraltar took place. Under Article XIII of the Treaty of 
Utrecht, the United Kingdom forced Spain to preserve the historic rights of 
Catalonia. A year later, in 1714, the Spanish Bourbon monarchy occupied 
Catalonia, an event ever present among autonomists and separatists in 
today’s Catalonia (and remembered during every soccer game of FC 
Barcelona). Given the escalation of tensions over the place of Catalonia in 
today’s Kingdom of Spain, a revitalization of the issue of sovereignty of 
Gibraltar might emerge at any time – or some sort of linkage with the 
Falkland/Malvinas dispute. Following the Brexit referendum, the then 
 
84  The European Council guidelines for Brexit negotiations agreed upon on 29 April 
2017 stated: “24. After the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
leaves the Union, no agreement between the EU and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland may apply to the territory of Gibraltar without the 
agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom.” Text available 
online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29/euco-
brexit-guidelines/; on the issue see Josep Garcia, Brexit: A View from Gibraltar, in: 
The Round Table. The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, op. cit., pp. 
585-586; Rémi Laurent, Gibraltar, ‚Détail‘ du Brexit, in: Taurillon, 7 April 2017, 
online at: https://www.taurillon.org/gibraltar-detail-du-brexit;  
Gibraltar is going to be an ever bigger Brexit problem than Ireland – so why does no 
one want to talk about it?, in: The Independent, 1 March 2018, online at: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/gibraltar-brexit-northern-ireland-border-
spain-theresa-may-a8234516.html.  
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Spanish Foreign Minister immediately recalled Spain’s claim to shared 
sovereignty with the Spanish flag also rising over “The Rock”. 85  Upon 
leaving the EU, the United Kingdom would certainly need to expect further 
pressure to re-open the Gibraltar sovereignty issue.  
In this context, it should also be noted that the African Union (AU) has 
always considered Saint Helena as a part of Africa in need of decolonization. 
The AU‘s claim for African independence includes the French départements 
La Réunion and Mayotte, Portugal’s Madeira and the Azores, the Spanish 
Canary Islands and, of course, Ceuta and Melilla. 86  No legally explicit 
sovereignty claims have been tabled in these cases yet – but they cannot be 
excluded forever. Escalating conflicts over migration or a revival of the 
Western Sahara issue could also bring Saint Helena and the Canary Islands 
back on the radar of unfulfilled claims of sovereignty. There is one aspect, 
lawyers would argue, which makes those claims legally untenable: Neither 
the Canary Islands nor Saint Helena were settled before Europeans took 
possession of these islands. Hence, the principle of uti possidetis would 
apply. But the same has always been said for the Falkland Islands, not pre-
empting the escalation of the Falklands/Malvinas issue which was not been 
laid to rest by the British victory in the Falklands War of 1982. Once dubbed 
“the world’s most useless airport”87, the airport on Saint Helena –with costs 
of 285 million British pounds and operational since late 2017 – might one 
 
85  Tom Batchelor, Gibraltar sovereignty shock: Spain unleashes post Brexit power 
claim over Rock, in; The Express, 6 October 2016, online at: 
https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/718010/Gibraltar-sovereignty-Spain-makes-
case-for-joint-sovereignty-of-the-Rock-to-UN;  
Quel avenir pour Gibraltar après Brexit?, in: Toute l’Europe.EU, 29 May 2018, 
online at: https://www.touteleurope.eu/actualite/quel-avenir-pour-gibraltar-apres-le-
brexit.html; Lucía Abellán, Spain hopeful of closing Gibraltar Brexit deal with UK 
by October, in: El Pais, 21 September 2018, online at: https://elpais.com/elpais/ 
2018/09/21/inenglish/1537521278_926151.html.  
86  See Annex 3, List of African countries/territories under foreign occupation, in: 
African Union, Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission, vol. 1: Vision and 
Mission of the African Union, Addis Ababa 2004, p. 43, online at: 
https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/01300_austratplanvol1.pdf  
87  Simon Calder, Saint Helena: World’s most useless airport finally gets scheduled 
flight, in: Independent, 25 July 2017, online at: https://www.independent.co.uk/ 
travel/news-and-advice/st-helena-flights-most-useless-airport-south-atlantic-
johannesburg-airlink-windshear-a7858581.html. 
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day serve strategic purposes initially unthought-of. Publicly, the airport in 
Saint Helena was primarily considered as opening avenues for tourism and 
facilitating interactions between the Saints, as the 4.500 locals are called, 
with the wider world (their motto: “Loyal and Unshakeable”). Access by air 
to Saint Helena remains subject to unpredictable weather conditions in the 
South Atlantic. The potential for tourism and business remains extremely 
limited in a place almost stopped in time with its 1950s atmosphere and the 
empty tomb of Napoleon, which remains the national property of France, 
along with Longwood House, where the fallen emperor died in exile in 
1821.88 Nevertheless, in the meantime the Saint Helena airport operates and 
can serve long-term strategic purposes of the United Kingdom. It should not 
be excluded from becoming an auxiliary base for the larger military 
operation in Ascension, northwest of Saint Helena and administered by the 
Governor residing in Jamestown. The completion of repair work on the 
airport of Ascension Island with a long and relevant military history during 
World War I and World War II surely has strategic meaning for “Global 
Britain”: the United Kingdom is preparing to face a world without natural 
EU solidarity.  
The airports in Ascension and Saint Helena are gateways to the Falkland 
Islands, which in turn are the British gateway to Antarctica, most likely the 
continent of future disputes and scrambles.89 They are also strategic assets in 
the fight against maritime piracy along the West African coast or possible 
springboards to engage in crises on the African continent. Ascension’s 
Wideawake Airfield has always been a stronghold of the British military and 
security cooperation with the US, which flew 25,000 military planes to North 
Africa and Europe during World War II via Ascension. Under the 2003 US-
 
88  France maintains a national domain at the sites where Napoleon lived in Saint 
Helena, taken care of by an Honorary Consul. For good reading see his book: Michel 
Dancoisne-Martineau, Je suis le gardien du tombeau vide, Paris: Flammarion, 2017. 
89  The strategic importance of both airports became evident when transportation was 
restricted in Ascension due to repair needs on the runway: Henry Bodkin/Simon Pipe, 
British Antactic scientists among those stranded as crumbling Ascension Island 
runway closed to big aircraft, in: Daily Telegraph, 17 April 2017, online at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/17/british-antarctic-scientists-among-
stranded-crumbling-ascension/. 
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United Kingdom Agreement (revised and renewed in 2008), the US is 
currently operating an NSA unit on Ascension.90 Ascension’s large airport 
for sure, but also Saint Helena’s new airport will be relevant in any scenario 
affecting the long-term balance of power in the oceans around Africa. The 
United Kingdom has always understood British overseas territories to be 
strategic assets in the context of defense and security. This stands in sharp 
contrast to the European Union, which has always organized overseas 
countries and territories under its policy of international cooperation and 
development. Of course, also in the United Kingdom, development funds in 
support of overseas territories are channeled through the Department of 
International Development. But the 2002 British Overseas Territories Act 
has re-defined former overseas dependencies or colonies as overseas 
territories, thus alluding to strategic political interests beyond development 
cooperation. The primacy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
in taking care of the interests of overseas territories91 coincides with an 
unequivocal understanding of the strategic meaning of British overseas 
territories. Never was this made more explicit than in a 2012 paper published 
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) under the title “The 
Overseas Territories: security, success and sustainability”. 92  The six 
 
90  United States. Department of Defense, Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of The United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and Northern Ireland concerning the use of Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island 
by civil aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services, online at: 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/165387.pdf; see also Ian Hendry 
/Susan Dickson, British Overseas Territories Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018 
(2nd edition).    
91  In the British government, the FCO is responsible for all overseas territories except 
for the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar and the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and 
Dhekelia (Cyprus) who are under the responsibility of the (junior) Minister of State 
for Europe and the Americas with a strong influence of the Ministry of Defense.  
92  Foreign and Commonwealth Office (ed.), The Overseas Territories: Strategy, 
Success and Sustainability, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, London: Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 2012, online at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/14929/ot-wp-0612.pdf; 
for a rare theoretical reflection see Fiona McConnell/Jason Dittmer, Liminality and 
the diplomacy of the British Overseas Territories: An Assemblage approach, in: 
Society and Space, vol. 36 (1), 2018, pp. 139-158. 
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priorities outlined in this paper differ fundamentally in language and 
priorities from any past EU Overseas Association Decision or the latest 2018 
draft. The structure alone of the FCO report is telling: 
 Defense, security and safety of the territories and their people. 
 Successful and resilient economies. 
 Cherishing the environment. 
 Making government work better. 
 Vibrant and flourishing communities. 
 Productive links with the wider world. 
The United Kingdom has begun to react to possible new sovereignty claims 
over its OCTs with a smart strategic projection of soft power claims: The 
United Kingdom pursued the idea of establishing Exclusive Economic Zones 
and Marine Protected Areas around the Chagos Archipelago, but also around 
Tristan da Cunha and Pitcairn. While in principle this is possible under the 
UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the unilateral British 
decision to create a maritime protected area around the Chagos Archipelago 
was already met in 2011 with resistance from Mauritius disputing the right 
of the United Kingdom to do so. The matter became the subject of an arbitral 
tribunal case under Annex VII of UNCLOS, initiated by Mauritius on the 
grounds of the ongoing dispute over sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, 
to which the United Kingdom is not a direct neighbor as required by 
UNCLOS.93  
The question of the current and future legal status of Pitcairn was already 
raised in 2003, in the context of a legal case in which several Pitcairn men 
were accused of sexual misconduct. While the court rulings following an 
exceptional prosecution reinforced the concept of British possession 
acquired by settlement (based on the British Settlement Act of 1887), 
excessive legal considerations were given to the long-term impact of 
territorial sovereignty on an island whose – only policeman is from New 
Zealand, which uses the New Zealand dollar as its main currency and whose 
support ship is regularly loaded in New Zealand. “Does the Pitcairn case,” 
 
93  See Bec Strating, The Strategic Consequence of the Diego Garcia Dispute, in: The 
Maritime Executive, 28 March 2019, op. cit. 
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Sue Farran has asked already more than a decade before the Brexit 
referendum, “mark the first step in a process by which Pitcairn will be 
brought in line with other Pacific island countries in the Realm of New 
Zealand?” 94 What will it take from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland in the long run to maintain loyalty on an island whose only 
mailbox still shows the insignia of King George VI, with the Duke of 
Edinburgh in 1971 being the last member of the Royal family to visit 
Pitcairn? So far, introducing renewable energy for the whole island has faced 
serious economic problems, which the United Kingdom has not yet resolved. 
Nor has marketing of Pitcairn honey led to viable economic effects to make 
Pitcairn sustainable. More than any other British overseas territory, Pitcairn 
is confronted with a unique sovereignty challenge: Depopulation. Children 
are rarely born on Pitcairn. Young Pitcairners tend to leave the island for 
New Zealand (or do not return after attending boarding school there). Efforts 
to attract migration to Pitcairn has not led to any visible effects yet. The 
United Kingdom, of course, wants to maintain its strategic presence in the 
Pacific for which Pitcairn is meaningful: Declaring unilaterally the complete 
Exclusive Economic Zone of Pitcairn a marine protected area in 2015 (one 
of the largest in the world) was a strategic step taken by the British 
government to enhance the legitimacy of its sovereignty claim over Pitcairn. 
The dispute over the Chagos Archipelago on the same issue nurtures caution 
for the long-term success of this strategy. One fact is certain: Strategically, 
Pitcairn remains relevant as it lies on the sea routes from the Panama Canal 
to Antarctica.    
 
94  See Sue Farran, The ‘Recolonising’ of Pitcairn, in: Victoria University of Wellington 
Law Review, vol. 27 (2007), online at: http://www8.austlii.edu.au/nz/journals/ 
VUWLawRw/2007/27.html; “The facilitation of the trials through the Pitcairn Trials 
Act 2002 (NZ), put in place as a consequence of Anglo-New Zealand agreement, has 
embroiled New Zealand in the affairs and governance of Pitcairn in a new and more 
formalized way and potentially brings Pitcairn more closely under the vicarious 
administration of New Zealand. The agreement allows for New Zealand laws to be 
applied to Pitcairn trials held in New Zealand, for the appointment of New Zealand 
judges and the support of New Zealand police and prison authorities.” The article 
discusses the possibility to replace British territorial claims with, among other 
options, a free association status of Pitcairn with New Zealand. 
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For the United Kingdom, overseas territories never were an appendix to a 
benevolent development agenda. According to the FCO report cited above, 
overseas territories are strategic pillars in a system of global presence, norm 
diffusion and power projection. The European Union could learn a lot from 
studying this legacy of British foreign policy. Once the overseas component 
is included, it becomes evident that the exit of the United Kingdom from the 
European Union will also be a big loss for the EU:  It will make the EU more 
parochial and less strategic – unless decisive and creative consequences are 
drawn from Brexit. The future of EU relations with the overseas territories – 
with or without the British one’s – is a test-case for a comprehensive 
evolution of the EU global strategy.  
The Brexit paradox is pertinent. In terms of territorial and maritime 
possessions, the European Union was about to shrink at a time when it has 
accelerated the ambition to go global, while the United Kingdom claims to 
re-invent “Global Britain” while exposing British overseas territories to 
greater uncertainties without the umbrella – and if only the umbrella of last 
resort – of “natural” EU solidarity. 
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IV.  OCTs: Between Europe’s post-colonial past and the 
EU’s geostrategic future  
Any informed look at a global map makes it evident: The European Union is 
a global archipelago. No other global power can claim what the EU can: the 
territory of its member states is spread across all continents and oceans. With 
or without Brexit, the assets defining this global European archipelago 
remain important. In fact, the return of maritime geopolitics enhances their 
strategic importance exponentially. Yet, across the European Union as a 
whole, the significance of the European archipelago is clearly neglected. 
Efforts are desirable and, in act, urgently needed, to enhance the perception 
of the European archipelago as a pillar of the global role of the European 
Union. To do so requires more than a technical and financial directive issued 
and implemented by the EU. 
The EU-OCT association is based on experience and history. It has proven 
to be beneficial in the pursuit of the principles outlined and shall continue to 
do so. However, the reasoning of the EU-OCT association – in fact: its long- 
term rationale and legitimization – have to be reinforced and rebranded. To 
understand the meaning and implication of the European archipelago, the 
European Union as a whole – that is all its institutions and all its member 
states – must realize the strategic value and better utilize the common good, 
which the EU overseas countries and territories provide.  
In turn, those EU member states to which OCTs belong should help their EU 
partners to understand, recognize and embrace the unique assets their OCTs 
contribute to the process of forming the European archipelago. A graduation 
of the Overseas Countries and Territories under the EU roof would simplify 
EU policy instruments. The notion of a global European archipelago as the 
basis for the global strategy of the EU has strategic and thematic, territorial 
and institutional implications. Hence, the graduation of EU Overseas 
Countries and Territories is a test-case for the projection of European 
external interests. Most importantly, such a graduation of EU OCTs is a test-
case for global strategic thinking in the EU. Global strategic thinking cannot 
longer neglect the maritime dimension of globalization.  
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Starting point for a strategic rebranding of EU Overseas Countries and 
Territories is the maritime dimension OCTs represent for EU policy making. 
The OCTs frame the global maritime presence of the European Union. 
Strategists might even argue that they define the EU as a global maritime 
power. Fact of matter is: In terms of maritime boundaries, the EU – due to 
the Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the EU – is the second 
largest maritime power.95The European Union has shown its capability to 
advance its potential for norm projection towards the association with the 
Overseas Countries and Territories.  
The interests covered by the EU-OCT association embrace key themes 
relevant for furthering the EU’s soft power projection: 
 Fishing regulation96, trade and infrastructure management; 
 Climate change and disaster risk reduction; 
 Oceanic research and maritime biodiversity protection.97 
 
 
 
95  This is not merely a phantasy of the French left as indicated by Wolf Lepenies, 
Maritime Macht-Träume der französischen Linken, in: Die Welt, 19 December 2014, 
online at: https://www.welt.de/geschichte/article135551548/Maritime-Macht-
Traeume-der-franzoesischen-Linken.html. 
96  Specific fishing matters related to OCTs are overlapping with the EU fishing policy, 
which includes fishing access agreements with developing countries around the 
globe. Limited by overfishing local stocks, the EU has continuously expanded the 
use of the Exclusive Economic Zones of other countries. The public fees paid and 
the private business effects are studied in detail by Frédéric Le Manach et. al., 
European Union’s fishing Access Agreements in Developing Countries, in: PLOS 
ONE, vol. 8/11 (2013), pp. 1-10, online at: https://journals.plos.org/ 
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0079899.   
97  The EU is understood to be the biggest initiator of maritime research worldwide. At 
the center of EU activities in this field lies the voluntary scheme for Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services in Territories of European overseas (BEST), for strategy and 
details see the BEST webpage, online at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ 
nature/biodiversity/best/index_en.htm#. From 2021 onwards, BEST is planned to be 
continued under another EU environmental program, named LIFE. For details on 
LIFE see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/bestprojects/index.htm.      
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Map 2: Territory covered by BEST, the voluntary scheme for Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services in Territories of European overseas (BEST). Copyright: © IUCN, design by 
UnitGraphics. 
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By insisting on the freedom of maritime navigation and the freedom of sea 
routes, including the unchallenged use of submarine cables, the EU at least 
rhetorically combines norm projection with economic interests. In terms of 
global economic interests, the EU strongly argues – with or without the 
associated OCTs – the importance of open skies and freedom of maritime 
navigation. In the field of environmental protection and climate change the 
EU has contributed to global governance.98 In line with the reasoning of the 
EU, OCTs can indeed provide best practices in these policy areas and set 
meaningful global standards. This goes way beyond public policy 
approaches in pursuit of protecting global commons. Private research at the 
cross-roads of economic interests and the value of maritime biodiversity (and 
its appreciation by European customers) has embraced the potential of some 
OCTs and of the Outermost Regions of the EU, too: French cosmetic 
companies have engaged in research for new health and skin products with 
a Caribbean or a Pacific flavor. Tourism and service industries have always 
thrived in some OCTs – and will most likely never become meaningful in 
others. 
Since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was 
finalized in 1982, the European Union as a contracting party has supported 
UNCLOS norms and contributed to their re-interpretation. However, the 
status of the EU as a global economic power has not necessarily reinforced 
the EU’s ability to project its soft power norms into the most sensitive and 
 
98  This might include surprising new dimensions such as the discussion on “climate 
refugees”. In 2017, New Zealand was confronted for the first time with the request 
by a family from Tuvalu to receive refugee status due to deteriorating living 
conditions in the South Pacific state. A New Zealand court rejected the demand. In 
2018, the New Zealand government reportedly was preparing a climate change 
refugee visa program, which in turn was rejected by Tuvalu and other Pacific island 
states. Their prime objective is to alleviate the damage done by climate change 
without being finger pointed as refugee-producing states; see: Thomas Manch, 
Humanitarian visa proposed for climate change refugees dead in the water, in: stuff, 
29 August 2018, online at: https://www.stuff.co.nz/environment/ 106660148 
/humanitarian-visa-proposed-for-climate-change-refugees-dead-in-the-water.  
The environmental protection agenda includes other particularly dramatic 
dimensions in the South Pacific where there is the highest density of plastic garbage 
in the world and where the weather phenomenon El Niño impacts prices for food 
products. Often one is inclined to conclude that South Sea is a sad sea.   
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far-reaching global maritime spheres. A geopolitical reconsideration of the 
European archipelago has to go beyond the current agenda of OCT 
association. It has to recognize long-term prospects – challenges and 
opportunities alike. Three issues stand out: (a) long-term sovereignty 
matters, (b) the future of Antarctica, and (c) freedom of the sea, including 
the protection of submarine cables. 
(a)  Any meaningful EU global strategy has to be aware of the unknown and 
the unexpected. Geopolitical developments or events might arise in years or 
decades to come, which seem to be a matter of fantasy today.99 Strategic 
foresight requires to face those possibilities as early as possible. The EU, as 
an advocate of a global multilateral rule-based order cannot neglect trends 
and scenarios, which might currently be of low priority or of interest to only 
a few. Without sounding alarmist, it has become evident that the 2016 Brexit 
referendum in itself – as discussed above – has already reactivated 
sovereignty claims, which were unheard of for years. Historic experience 
would warn against underestimating long-term sovereignty matters. 
One variant is related to sovereignty claims from within. Different 
experiences can be recalled. Greenland and St. Barthélemy provide the 
smartest examples for secession from the EU without giving up the 
advantages of association. Like few other Caribbean overseas territories, St. 
Barthélemy strongly benefits from luxury tourism and financial services. 
Limited by its scope of action with the need to connect with France via the 
regional French airport in Saint-Martin and/or directly via the international 
Dutch airport in Sint Maarten, St. Barthélemy exercised sufficient leverage 
in recent years to change its overall status within France and hence the wider 
European family. St. Barthélemy wanted to retain fiscal autonomy in an 
effort to position the island as an offshore center for financial services. At 
the same time, St. Barthélemy did not want to pay welfare subsidies in order 
 
99  For a sober assessment see Heinz Dieter Jopp/Roland Kaestner, Eine globale 
Übersichtsanalyse von möglicher politisch oder ökonomisch motivierter maritimer 
Gewalt in den nächsten 20 Jahren, PiraT-Arbeitspapiere zur Maritimen Sicherheit, 
Nr. 15, Hamburg: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der 
Universität Hamburg, 2012, online at: http://maritimesecurity.eu/ 
fileadmin/content/news_events/workingpaper/PiraT_Arbeitspapier_Nr15_2012_Jo
pp_Kaestner.pdf.  
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to curb migration to the island of the happy few. In a 2003 referendum, the 
inhabitants of St. Barthélemy voted for secession from the jurisdiction of 
Guadeloupe. This happened in 2007 in accordance with the French 
constitution. By 2012, St. Barthélemy had completed transformation from an 
Outermost Region (as part of Guadeloupe) to an overseas territory associated 
to the EU but without the legal obligations of EU membership arising from 
customs union and the Single Market.100 At the same time, however, based 
on a special arrangement with France, St. Barthélemy was able to retain the 
euro as its sole currency, thus benefitting from the best of both worlds. 
Without touching on the sovereignty matter as such, St. Barthélemy changed 
the parameters of how sovereignty is applied. After Greenland and before 
the United Kingdom, St. Barthélemy was the second territory to leave the 
European Union.  
The Greenland case is the better known example for a soft change of 
sovereignty parameters from within.101 In 1985, the rising quest for Inuit 
identity and the rejection of EU fishery policies led to the first ever 
withdrawal of a territory from the EU – and the subsequent need to redefine 
the relationship between Greenland and Denmark. Unlike Greenland, the 
Faroe Islands never entered the European Union with Denmark. To this day, 
they continue to struggle for more autonomy directly with Copenhagen. It 
was only after the Brexit referendum that the Faroe Islands felt its 
dependency on the EU Single Market for the export of its fish.102 As a matter 
of long-term precaution, Faroese fishermen looked for other options: In the 
meantime, Russians have become the biggest buyers of Faroese fish. In spite 
of Denmark’s strict policies against Russia after the annexation of the 
Crimea in 2014 (fully in line with the EU as a whole), Denmark closed an 
eye as the Faroe Islands replaced the British market with exports to Russia 
 
100  For details see Phoebus Athanassiou/Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, EU Accession from 
Within? An introduction, in: Yearbook of European Law, vol. 33, no. 1 (2014), pp. 
370-373. 
101  See Christan Rebhan, North Atlantic Euroscepticism. The rejection of EU 
membership in the Faroe Islands and Greenland, Tórshavn: Faroe University Press, 
2016. 
102  On the broader issue of Faroese identity see Hans Andrias Sølvará, The rise of 
Faroese Separatism, Tórshavn: Faroe University Press, 2016.  
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(which Greenland had already practiced for much longer). The fact that 
Russia has become the biggest export partner for the Faroe Islands raises 
questions concerning Faroese dependency and of the cohesion of Denmark’s 
Russia policy – yet another untold story of the immediate effects of the 2016 
Brexit referendum.  
New Caledonia experienced the most radical other extreme – and it is not 
over yet. The 1988 Matignon Agreements and the 1998 Noumea Accord 
ended a lengthy period of violent uprising among the Kanak people in New 
Caledonia. Hatred and anti-French resentment was slow to disappear among 
many indigenous Kanaks. Only almost a generation later, those eligible 
among the 270,000 citizens of New Caledonia were asked in a referendum 
to reassess the situation and decide on their future status. On 4th November 
2018, 56,4 percent voted in favor of remaining part of the French Republic, 
46.6 percent voted in favor of independence.103 But the constitutional debate 
was not over yet. In May 2019, while provincial elections were won by pro-
French loyalists, elections for the New Caledonian congress were won by 
pro-independence groups. In line with the Noumea Accord, two more 
referenda with the option of acquiring full independence will be held in 2020 
and in 2022. 104  Prospects for the post-referendum development of New 
Caledonia include the option of becoming an “associated state” of France, 
fully independent, but delegating some of its competences (especially in the 
field of security and foreign policy) to France. Another option is defined by 
the concept of a “federated state” that is a political entity with a constitution 
of its own but remaining part of France.105 In spite of the 2018 referendum 
 
103  See La Nouvelle-Calédonie vote à 56% pour rester française, in: Le Monde, 5 
November 2018, online at: https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/ 
2018/11/04/nouvelle-caledonie-un-taux-de-participation-au-referendum-de-41-81-
a-la-mi-journee_5378556_823448.html.  
104  See Le Figaro avec AFP, Nouvelle-Calédonie: un sénateur LR appelle à un deuxième 
référendum «le plus tôt possible», in: Le Figaro, 6 June 2019, online at: 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/nouvelle-caledonie-un-senateur-lr-appelle-a-un-
deuxieme-referendum-le-plus-tot-possible-20190606.  
105 See Gaétan Trillat, Nouvelle-Calédonie: le référendum sur l’indépendance en cinq 
questions, in: Sudouest, 3 May 2018, online at: https://www.sudouest.fr/ 
2018/05/03/nouvelle-caledonie-le-referendum-sur-l-independance-en-cinq-
questions-5025975-710.php.   
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result, the situation in New Caledonia remains tense. Strong migration from 
Wallis et Futuna to New Caledonia has complicated coherent solutions. 
While working class citizens from Wallis et Futuna are mostly loyal to 
France, young Kanaks tend to increasingly define their identity as distinct 
and separate from France. 
In all three French Pacific OCTs, the issue of independence is overshadowed 
by a growing strategic concern – if not outright fear – about the rising 
influence of China in the South Pacific. Against the background of this 
strategic challenge (including for New Caledonia’s nickel industry), a 
stronger European contextualization of the future status of New Caledonia 
(considered an overseas collectivity sui generis with a high degree of 
autonomy) must be considered a reasonable option. In Wallis et Futuna and 
in French Polynesia, this European perspective has included the desire by 
some leaders to fully introducing the euro as local currency for many years, 
while the appetite for the euro is less strong in New Caledonia. The 
introduction of the euro in all three French Pacific OCTs would require an 
EU Treaty revision not to be excluded as part of a strategy of Europeanizing 
the Pacific French OCTs.  
In the Dutch Antilles the fire over status and sovereignty has been ignited 
from both ends. In 2010, the Netherlands Antilles were dissolved with Sint 
Maarten, Aruba and Curaçao becoming “countries” (landen), and Saba, St. 
Eustatius and Bonaire becoming “special communities” (bezondere 
gemeenten) of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The new status and its 
impact have not been met with satisfaction by all parties involved. On the 
one hand, Dutch politicians time and again are on record for wanting to “get 
rid” of the Caribbean countries and territories belonging to the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands. Royal visits to the Antilles only partially alleviate tensions 
and remain a matter of symbolic politics. Some years ago, Prime Minister 
Mark Rutte was said to have let Dutch Caribbean leaders know that they 
could have independence if they really wished so within a fortnight. This 
provocative statement was meant to extinguish criticism over alleged neglect 
and denial, especially by aid-dependent Saba and St. Eustatius. Like French 
and British territories in the Caribbean, Dutch OCTs have a highly 
problematic record of human and drug trafficking into the European Union. 
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This situation was exacerbated by reports that IS recruits could enter the EU 
or the United States via the Caribbean. Lately, the efforts of Sint Maarten to 
enforce more rigid migration controls have received positive reactions in The 
Hague. They were explicitly lauded by Prime Minister Rutte during a 2018 
visit to the Dutch OCTs. In the aftermath of the shocking devastations caused 
by hurricane Irma in 2017, complaints about the mismanagement of public 
subsidies from the Dutch government have calmed down.106 Sint Maarten, 
flourishing with tourism, continuously lives with a split identity: As recently 
as in 2016, the majority of members of the parliament of Sint Maarten were 
on the record demanding sovereignty and independence.107  
The issue of sovereignty looms over the Dutch territories Aruba, Bonaire and 
Curaçao (ABC islands) from the outside, too. Ever since Venezuela became 
independent, it has claimed the ABC islands as a legitimate part of its 
territory. The political radicalization in Venezuela over the past two decades 
has not occurred without concern in the Dutch OCTs. For them, it is 
impossible to present their international interests via a representation of their 
own, let alone to defend their territorial borders. In turn, the Netherlands 
offers all relevant diplomatic and security ties to the ABC islands. In 2006, 
the amphibious sea landing operation “Sea Lion” took place in response to 
the vulnerability of Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao in light of a possible 
invasion from Venezuela. Whether in the worst case scenario, individual 
NATO member states, NATO as a whole or rather the European Union via 
an extended solidarity clause might become active on behalf of ABC 
freedom and territorial integrity, remains a theoretical matter for now – but 
 
106  Hilbert Haar, Praise Dutch Prime Minister Rutte for government SXM, in: Caribbean 
Network, 17 May 2018, online at: https://caribbeannetwork.ntr.nl/ 
2018/05/17/praise-dutch-prime-minister-rutte-for-government-sxm/. New efforts are 
being made to enhance investment in the Dutch OCTs and of OCT companies in the 
wider Caribbean and Latin America; see Annika, Export incentives for Dutch 
Caribbean companies, in: Free Zone Aruba, 22 March 2018, online at: 
https://www.freezonearuba.com/mebers/export-incentives-for-dutch-caribbean-
companies/.    
107  Lena D., St. Maarten Parliamentarians Call for Independence from the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, in: Atlanta Black Star, 8 September 2016, online at: 
http://atlantablackstar.com/2016/09/08/st-maarten-parliamentarians-call-
independence-kingdom-netherlands/.  
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is fervently discussed in Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao.108 The escalating 
crisis in Venezuela has brought ABC security into the limelight of global 
interest in 2019: When humanitarian aid for Venezuela was stored in 
Curaçao, the Maduro government immediately imposed an embargo for 
ships leaving Curaçao for Venezuela. Speculation runs high as to which other 
threatening measures could follow from a beleaguered regime dependent on 
support of the military. Even when the sovereignty matter is not triggered on 
principle from within or by external pressure, the semi-sovereign linkages 
between European and overseas territories in all their forms can produce 
problems. This is particularly the case when welfare and migration issues are 
affected. While citizens of OCTs as well as citizens of those overseas 
territories which are fully integrated into the legal order of the EU can travel 
visa free to the EU, the implication for migration matters can differ 
substantially. Dutch Caribbean OCTs have been confronted with demands to 
enhance control of migration. Mayotte, no longer an OCT but a French 
départément and as such fully integrated into the legal order of the EU, has 
been struggling with illegal migration from the Comoros and other African 
countries for years. The Comoros continuously claims sovereignty over 
Mayotte, an idyllic former part of the overall historic Comoros archipelago. 
France, and hence the EU, are confronted with migration pressure not 
completely different from the one the EU has faced in the Mediterranean: 
People are being smuggled by boat into Mayotte, among them a substantial 
number of pregnant mothers which then give birth to illegal immigrants in 
Mayotte. The number of births in Mayotte has increased by 45 percent 
between 2013 and 2016, with 9,500 babies born in 2016. While in the whole 
of France, the fertility rate is 12 per thousand, in Mayotte it has increased to 
40 per thousand. Giving birth to a child in Mayotte used to immediately 
imply French and hence EU citizenship. In response, President Macron 
supported certain limitations of French citizenship rights issued in Mayotte. 
On 26 July 2018, the National Assembly followed the French Senate in a 
second reading and voted in favor of a clause requiring a parent to have lived 
in Mayotte for more than three months before the birth of her or his child 
 
108  The Lisbon Treaty solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU) refers to terrorist attacks 
only and not to an outright invasion as reason for EU solidarity. 
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would automatically acquire French citizenship.109 In French Guiana with its 
235,000 citizens France remains torn between the need to cope with social 
unrest rooted in post-colonial welfare dependency and the geopolitical 
vocation which is related beyond any doubt to the spaceport Kourou, in 
existence since 1964. France has struggled for a long time to include outer 
space policy onto the list of objectives and competences of the European 
Union. The Lisbon Treaty includes this policy area as an objective of the EU, 
hence opening possible new avenues to co-financing the highly expensive 
Kourou spaceport. In spite of Kourou being heavily guarded, frustrated labor 
union leaders were able to occupy the spaceport in April 2017 for three 
weeks. Subsequent efforts of the French government to calm social tensions 
in the territory with high unemployment, startling poverty levels and 
dilapidated public infrastructure achieved cosmetic results, at best. Given 
demographic pressures, with a majority of (poor) people younger than 25 
years old, it should not be excluded that social unrest as seen in 2017 could 
easily spill over and reignite the sovereignty matter. During a contentious 
visit in October 2017, President Macron insisted that continuous subsidies 
without a sustainable domestic effort to enhance the living standard and cope 
with social problems would no longer work under his presidency. This clear 
message to demand ownership while remaining loyal to France was not well 
received in French Guiana.110  
 
109  See Patrick Roger, Macron apporte son soutien à un projet de limitation du droit du 
sol à Mayotte, in: Le Monde, 26 June 2018, online at: https://www.lemonde.fr/ 
politique/article/2018/06/19/une-breche-dans-le-droit-du-sol-a-mayotte_5317526_ 
823448.html; Corinne Laurent, Mayotte, Emmanuel Macron soutient une limitation 
du droit du sol, in: La Croix, 28 June 2018, online at: https://www.la-croix.com/ 
France/Politique/Mayotte-Emmanuel-Macron-soutient-limitation-droit-sol-2018-
06-28-1200950951; Mayotte: les députés approuvent la limitation du droit du sol, in: 
Le Parisien, 26 July 2018, online at: http://www.leparisien.fr/ politique/ mayotte-les-
deputes-approuvent-la-limitation-du-droit-du-sol-26-07-2018-7834707.php.  
For background on Mayotte see Karis Muller, Between Europe and Adrica. Mayotte, 
in: Rebecca Adler-Nissen/Ulrik Pram Gad (eds.), pp. 187-202. European Integration 
and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games. The EU Overseas Countries and Territories, 
op. cit. 
110  Emmanuel Macron en Guyane: „Je ne suis pas venu faire des promesses, ce temps-
là est fini“, in: Le Monde, 26 October 2017, online at: https://www.lemonde.fr/ 
politique/article/2017/10/26/emmanuel-macron-en-guyane-je-ne-suis-pas-venu-
faire-des-promesses-ce-temps-la-est-fini_5206508_823448. html.    
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Decolonization purists might still argue that all the remaining territories of 
the European archipelago should become independent and free. In 
recognizing colonial guilt, Europe should continue to subsidize development 
as it has done in many other former colonies. Such a perspective is old 
thinking. It does not take into account the enormous socio-cultural 
transformations, which have taken place across former colonies of European 
states but also in the European overseas countries and territories.111 Not all 
of them have gone through the same cycle of transformation – be it cultural, 
constitutional or economic. Today, no overseas country and territory can be 
compared to the situation they were all in when the wave of decolonization 
took place and the era of post-colonialism unfolded.  
(b) A generation later, overseas countries and territories have to be re-
evaluated as part of a European archipelago in a world of changing 
geopolitical parameters. In no area can this be exemplified better than with 
regard to the relevance European overseas countries and territories have in 
the future of Antarctica. Nowhere is the need for close EU cooperation with 
the United Kingdom and its overseas territories as relevant. A reasonable 
anticipation of a meaningful direction post-Brexit is the promotion of 
regional integration activities mentioned in the 2018 draft for a new EU 
Overseas Association Decision. This formula implies the potential to 
continue EU financial contributions to British research units such as the 
those on the Falkland Islands and in the British Antarctic Territory, used also 
by researchers from EU countries. As reasonable as this formula is in 
response to the 2016 Brexit referendum, the language in the draft new EU 
Overseas Association Decision is non-committal and hence non-strategic.  
 
 
 
 
 
111 For the wider context of the debate see Elizabeth Buettner, Europe after Empire. 
Decolonization, society and culture, New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016.  
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Map 3: Antarctica: Research Stations and Territorial Claims. Copyright: United States 
Central Intelligence Agency. 
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Any time after 2041, an international revision conference regarding the 
Environmental Protocol attached to the Antarctic Treaty (signed in 1991 and 
in force since 1998) is possible. 112  The Environmental Protocol has a 
duration of fifty years, meaning that it will expire in 2048 at the latest, unless 
renewed in the due course of time. The initial Antarctic Treaty, signed in 
1959 and in force since 1961, had a duration of thirty years.113 In 1991, it 
was thematically broadened by the Environmental Protocol. At the same 
time, the very duration of the Atlantic Treaty was extended for fifty years, 
hence coupled to the duration of the Environmental Protocol. Since the 
revision and renewal of the Antarctic Treaty in 1991, any single consultative 
state signatory to the Atlantic Treaty can request a revision of the treaty at 
 
112 “The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was signed in 
Madrid on October 4, 1991 and entered into force in 1998. It designates Antarctica 
as a “natural reserve, devoted to peace and science” (Art. 2). Article 3 of the 
Environment Protocol sets forth basic principles applicable to human activities in 
Antarctica and Article 7 prohibits all activities relating to Antarctic mineral 
resources, except for scientific research. Until 2048 the Protocol can only be 
modified by unanimous agreement of all Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty. 
In addition, the prohibition on mineral resource activities cannot be removed unless 
a binding legal regime on Antarctic mineral resource activities is in force (Art. 25.5)”, 
online at: https://www.ats.aq/e/ep.htm.  
113“The Antarctic Treaty was signed in Washington on 1 December 1959 by the twelve 
countries whose scientists had been active in and around Antarctica during the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-58. It entered into force in 1961 and 
has since been acceded to by many other nations. The total number of Parties to the 
Treaty is now 53. Some important provisions of the Treaty: Antarctica shall be used 
for peaceful purposes only (Art. I). Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica 
and cooperation toward that end … shall continue (Art. II). Scientific observations 
and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely available (Art. III).  
Among the signatories of the Treaty are seven countries – Argentina, Australia, 
Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland - with territorial claims, sometimes overlapping. Other countries do 
not recognize any claims. The US and Russia maintain the right for territorial claims 
but have not expressed them yet. All positions are explicitly protected in Article IV, 
which preserves the status quo: No acts or activities taking place while the present 
Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim 
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in 
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.”, 
online at: https://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm.  
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any moment in time.114 Such a revision would require approval by the other 
consultative states. Yet, the option to reconsider the overall Antarctic Treaty 
system at any moment in time is on the table. The Antarctic Treaty and the 
subsequent emergence of a broader Antarctic Treaty system115 have framed 
a genuine system of Antarctic governance and regulation without, however, 
resolving any possible sovereignty issue and without eliminating possible 
disputes over economic interests in Antarctica and its surrounding waters. In 
the long run, Antarctica issues cannot be disconnected from the wider agenda 
of maritime biodiversity, deep sea mineral resources and global maritime 
security matters – and vice versa.116 The activities of the satellite “CryoSat-
 
114 Poland has become a consultative member state in 1977, Germany in 1981, Brazil in 
1983, China in 1985, Uruguay in 1985, Italy in 1987, Sweden in 1988, Spain in 1988, 
Finland in 1898, Peru in 1989, South Korea in 1989, Ecuador in 1990, the 
Netherlands in 1990, Bulgaria in 1998, Ukraine in 2004 and the Czech Republic in 
2014. So far, the United States, founding member of the Antarctic Treaty, has not 
placed territorial claims in Antarctica – like Russia, which demands since 1950 to be 
involved should any territorial negotiation take place. Back in 1948, the United States 
suggested to place Antarctica under supervision of the United Nations. Since a few 
years, the US stations special deputy US Marshals in Antarctica as an expression of 
law enforcement presence; see online at: www.usmarshals.gov/history/antarctica.   
115 The Antarctic Treaty has been extended by Agreed Measures for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Fauna and Flora (signed 1964, entered into force in 1982), the Convention 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (signed 1972), the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (signed 1982), and the Protocol 
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (signed in 1991, entered into 
force in 1998). The Convention of the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities was signed in 1988, but never came into force, because France and 
Australia withdrew in 1989, thus leading to the eventual negotiation of the 
comprehensive Environmental Protocol signed in 1991 and in force since 1998. It is 
also relevant to note that France, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland exchanged notes on aerial navigation in the 
Antarctic in 1938; France and Australia signed a treaty on cooperation in the 
maritime areas adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF), one of 
the EU’s associated OCTs, in 2003; and France and Australia signed an agreement 
on cooperative enforcement of fishery laws in the maritime areas adjacent to the 
French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF) in 2007. 
116 See, for example, McGrath, Matt, World’s largest marine protected area declared in 
Antarctica, in: BBC, 28 October 2016, online unter: http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
science-environment-37789594. The long-term potential of Antarctica has gone as 
far as considering Antarctica as a place to prepare food production in the service of 
manned expeditions to Mars: Reiche Gurken-Ernte in der Antarktis, in: Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 September 2018.  
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2” installed by the European Space Agency (ESA) to observe the ice caps of 
the world, has long shed an eye on Antarctica’s melting ice cap.117 But any 
satellite is also an instrument in the service of sublime power projection by 
those operating it. It is hard to believe that geopolitical innocence will prevail 
in Antarctica. 
Under the Antarctic Treaty, weapons are banned from Antarctica, mining of 
mineral resources is banned118, and the issue of territorial sovereignty on the 
third largest continent south of the 60th longitude is frozen. But will this 
remain so forever?  If it will, this would require long-term commitment of 
the international community to advance rule-based global governance 
beyond all current forms of sovereignty. It would require to replace the 
concept of sovereignty with a rigid mechanism to enforce the concept of 
„Common Heritage of Mankind“.119 
 
117 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Das ewige Eis schmilzt dahin, 15 June 2018; 
for details see the Cryosat-Webpage: http://www.esa.int/ Our_Activities/ 
Observing_the_Earth/CryoSat.  
118 “The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was signed in 
Madrid on 4 October 1991 and entered into force in 1998. It designates Antarctica as 
a “natural reserve, devoted to peace and science” (Art. 2). Article 3 of the 
Environment Protocol sets forth basic principles applicable to human activities in 
Antarctica and Article 7 prohibits all activities relating to Antarctic mineral 
resources, except for scientific research. Until 2048 the Protocol can only be 
modified by unanimous agreement of all Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty. 
In addition, the prohibition on mineral resource activities cannot be removed unless 
a binding legal regime on Antarctic mineral resource activities is in force (Art. 25.5)”, 
online at: https://www.ats.aq/e/ep.htm. 
119 The concept of „Common Heritage of Mankind“ was first mentioned in the preamble 
to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict. In 1970, the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and 
Ocean Floor, adopted as United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2749, defined 
the deep seabed which should be preserved for peaceful purposes as the “Common 
Heritage of Mankind.” In 1982, the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty 
(UNCLOS) defined “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction” (Article 136) as the “Common Heritage of Mankind”. 
One of the architects of the principle was Alfred Pardo, Malta’s Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations between 1964 and 1971. He summarized his 
life-long work in a lecture subsequently published as: Alfred Pardo, Ocean and 
mankind, in: Third World Quarterly, vol. 6/3, 1984, pp. 559-572, online at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436598408419785.  
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UN member states have developed consensus on matters of environmental 
protection, animal and plant protection and environmental assessment 
procedures. To this day, this consensus is the basis for the peaceful 
organization of almost forty research stations across Antarctica, more than 
half of them permanently manned. However, hardly anybody believes that 
the countries maintaining these stations do not, at least sometimes and in 
some cases, cross red lines demarcated by the Antarctic Treaty system.  
Are the rumors about military surveillance visits of submarines from various 
countries into the waters south of the 60th longitude only rumors? Why does 
waste management governance remain so poorly enforced in the oceans of 
the world, including in the waters around Antarctica?  
How can fishing regulations and fish breeding protection cope with the ever 
increasing fishing activities in the unregulated waters close to Antarctica, 
especially but not only in the regions around and south of the Falkland 
Islands?  
The failure of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR) to find consensus on creating a marine 
sanctuary in the Wedell Sea, which would be the world’s largest of its kind 
five times the size of Germany, rings alarm bells. In spite of strong backing 
by the large majority of the 24 CCAMLR member states and the European 
Union, the veto pronounced by Russia, China and Norway at the annual 
CCAMLR conference in November 2018 was more than a backlash for 
environmentalists concerned about sustainable fishing in the Antarctic 
waters.120 The lack of consensus on protecting key species in the Wedell Sea 
is indicative for the increasing geo-economic and geopolitical scramble for 
Antarctica.   
 
Among the few existing publications on the matter in relation to Antarctica, see: 
Jennifer Frakes, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, 
Outer Space, and Antarctica. Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a 
Compromise?, in: Wisconsin International Law Journal, vol. 21/20003, pp. 409, 
online at: https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/wisint21 
&div=18&id=&page=.  
120  See The Telegraph, Plans for world’s largest ocean sanctuary in Antarctic blocked, 
3 November 2018, online at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2018/11/03/plans-
worlds-largest-ocean-sanctuary-antarctic-blocked/.      
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Antarctic mineral resources below the ice cap of 1.7 kilometer depth (on 
average, in various Antarctic regions the ice cap is much lower) are 
abundant. 45 barrels of oil, 115 million cubic meters of gas, titanium, 
chrome, iron, copper, coal, platinum and gold activate human fantasy and 
resource hunger. 121  Competing territorial claims are already manifold 
now.122 One should add that Kerguelen (since 1772 a territory of France), 
although belonging geographically to Antarctica, is not covered by the 
Antarctic Treaty because it lies north of the 60th longitude. Kerguelen, 
without an airport, is part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands 
(TAAF), an EU associated OCT. 123  Likewise, South Georgia and the 
Southern Sandwich Islands (claimed by Great Britain since 1775, claimed 
by Argentina since 1927) are not covered by the Antarctic Treaty, but 
constitute a British overseas territory, accessible only by ship from the 
Falkland Islands. For the time being, the EU agenda for Antarctica and the 
oceans north of it is primarily about biospheres, environmental protection, 
climate change, cruise ship tourism, waste control, especially plastic 
garbage.124 But whale watching and the protection of penguins and seals will 
not remain the only issues related to Antarctica: Most likely, in the years and 
decades ahead geopolitics will increasingly effect the southern oceans and 
Antarctica, the third largest contingent on the planet. European overseas 
countries and territories might become strategic pawns in the global 
European archipelago. The strategic significance of overseas territories – 
 
121 Data from the Wikipedia-article ‘Antarktis-Vertrag’, online at: https://de.wikipedia. 
 org/wiki/Antarktis-Vertrag. 
122 Especially relevant are those between The United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Argentina, Chile and Brazil 
on the Antarctic Peninsula and in surrounding territories. For details ibid. 
123  The strategic accessibility of these territories enhances the role of the French 
départements Mayotte and La Réunion, but likewise the military cooperation of 
France with India and Australia. See: Frank van Rooyen, Africa and the Geopolitics 
of the Indian Ocean, South African Institute of International Affairs, Occasional 
Paper, no. 78, 2011, online at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/145975/saia_sop_78_ 
vanrooyen_20110225.pdf. 
124 Much in line with NGO positions, e.g. World Wildlife Fund for Nature, WWF 
Global, Threats to oceans and coasts, online at: https://wwf.panda.org/our_work/ 
 oceans/problems/. 
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OCTs and French territories with a different nomenclature (La Réunion, 
Mayotte, French Polynesia, Wallis et Futuna, and New Caledonia as well as 
all French territories in the Caribbean are equipped with good airports) – will 
be measured by the quality of air connectivity to Europe and to European 
allies in the global South. The projection of military power is already an 
element in the strategic interpretation of the meaning of the European 
archipelago. This includes the uninhabited French territory of Clipperton 
which is sometimes visited by French military ships. Clipperton could 
potentially be extended to serve as an auxiliary service station in defending 
freedom of navigation through the Panama Canal and into the South Pacific.     
(c) Not every power projection is about the militarization of the globe. But 
power projection is also a way to anticipate and possibly balance power 
ambitions of other countries – and hence avoid conflicts from escalating 
militarily. In this sense, the geostrategic future of a re-interpreted European 
archipelago might have only just begun. Freedom of the sea, including 
freedom of navigation and the protection of submarine cables, is of the 
essence in understanding the strategic challenge ahead. Taken together, the 
planet’s oceans constitute seventy percent of the surface of the earth, 
generating five percent of all global economic activities. 125  The United 
Nations has recognized 38 countries as Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS). With a population of less than two million people, these states are 
strongly exposed to the consequences of remoteness and climate-related 
vulnerabilities. However, these island states are also treasurers of gigantic 
ocean resources and hence the potential of blue economy. Tony de Brum, the 
late former foreign minister of the Marshall Islands and one of the key actors 
in bringing about the Paris Climate Convention in 2015, used to speak of big 
ocean states.126 Each of them has a vote in the United Nations. Engaging with 
 
125  According to World Bank estimates, the value generated via exploration of and 
production in the world’s oceans amounts to more than $2.5 billion. Were the oceans 
one territory, this would make them the seventh biggest country on earth, before 
Brazil, Italy, Russia or India; see: Die Bewirtschaftung der Meere fängt jetzt erst an, 
in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 February 2017.  
126  On his legacy see Lisa Friedman, Tony de Brum. Voice of Pacific Islands on Climate 
Change. Dies at 72, in: New York Times, 22 August 2017,  
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them makes sense for any country or regional grouping with a global 
ambition. In the European Union, it seems that only France pursues such a 
vocation: In 2018, French President Macron announced a global meeting of 
Small Island Developing States to be held in Paris in 2020. Maritime issues 
are returning to the global agenda. The disputes over China’s ambitions in 
the South China Sea are not a singular phenomenon. For the European 
Union, how to strategize the complexity of the maritime agenda in a 
comprehensive way is an ever increasing and genuine aspect in the EU 
commitment to a rule-based multilateral global order.127 
 
Map 4: The Arctic Region and New Sea Routes. Copyright: Malte Humpert, The Arctic 
Institute. 
 
online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/world/tony-de-brum-dead-climate-
change-advocate.html.  
127 For the historical context see the pioneering study by Jürgen Elvert, Europa, das Meer 
und die Welt. Eine maritime Geschichte der Neuzeit, Munich: DVA, 2018. Elvert 
convincingly shows how Europe’s dominance of the seas of the world has been an 
important, if not the central reason for the global leadership of Europe in modern 
history (p. 340).  
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The European Union is still struggling with its strategic myopia, slow and 
bureaucratic responses to realities shaped elsewhere. Other powers, Russia 
and China especially, have projected their strategic interests beyond the 
struggle to cope with climate change. Russia is attempting to obtain United 
Nations recognition for its claim of a huge extension of the Russian 
continental shelf. In order to support the strategic significance of its Arctic 
claims, Russia has expanded the world’s largest fleet of ice-breaking vessels. 
By 2035, nine of them shall be atomic driven. In September 2018, China 
presented the country’s second heavy ice-breaking vessel, the first of 
genuine Chinese production. The North-East-passage is already labeled “Ice 
Silk Road”. 128 While Russia has planted the country’s flag on the sea-floor 
of the North Pole, China also claims to be an Arctic power.  
The number of commercial vessels traversing the North-East-passage is 
constantly growing. While 18,000 ships still travel the 21,000 kilometer 
route from Rotterdam via the Suez Canal to Tokyo, the North-East-passage 
reduces costs enormously with only a 14,000 kilometer of sea voyage. The 
North-West passage along the northern coasts of Canada, reduces the 
shipping route from Rotterdam to Tokyo to 15,900 kilometer. In 2009, In 
August 2008, both the North-East-passage and the North-West-passage were 
ice-free at the same time. The world has come along way since Adolf Erik 
Nordenskiöld traversed the North-East-passage during two summers in 
1978/79 and Roald Amundsen traversed the North-West-passage between 
1903 and 1906.  
Germany is running the biggest container fleet in the world and claims to 
maintain one of the most modern research fleets worldwide – potential assets 
for a substantial Franco-German conversation on global maritime burden 
sharing. 129  Freedom of navigation will not come from good-will and 
technical solutions to the Arctic conditions alone. Enforceable regulatory 
measures are of the essence to benefit from long-term maritime opportunities 
 
128  See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Das Arktis-Eis schmilzt – ein neuer Seeweg 
entsteht, 2 May 2019, p. 16. 
129  See Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (ed.)., Umwelt und Klima. 
Küsten-, Meeres- und Polarforschung, Berlin 2016, online at: https://www.bmbf.de/ 
de/kuesten-meeres-und-polarforschung-339.html. 
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around the Arctic Circle. Since its creation in 1996, the Arctic Council is 
working on this agenda, supporting the management of Arctic affairs and its 
related international law.130 But European naiveté will not be enough to 
respond to the evolution of powerful geo-economic trends and their 
geopolitical ramifications. To balance the sustainability agenda with 
thorough strategic thinking is of the essence for the European Union to be 
taken seriously as a global maritime player.   
The Arctic agenda on sustainability is echoed in maritime matters around the 
oceans of the world. Economic interests focus primarily on deep seabed 
energy resources (e.g. manganese), preservation of biodiversity and freedom 
of navigation. Sustainable developments in the planet’s oceans requires 
regulatory cooperation, which in turn depends on the readiness of actors to 
politically cooperate and accept legally binding mechanisms. All experience 
considered, this will not come about through good will alone.131 Hence, the 
maritime presence and geopolitical claims of the European Union will give 
weight to the sustainability agenda central to the EU’s maritime policy 
objectives. A geopolitical reconsideration of the maritime presence will also 
reflect, and possibly support, the economic interests of EU member states in 
search for raw materials.132 Up until now, the European Union has been 
blocked from becoming even an observer member of the Arctic Council. In 
2013, the EU requested observer status in the Arctic Council. Canada vetoed 
EU observer status because of the EU ban on seal hunting. According to 
 
130  See Kristina Schönfeldt (ed.), The Arctic in International Law and Policy, 
Oxford/Portland: Hart, 2017. 
131  In a surprising initiative, in 2016 several international companies with fishing 
interests in the Arctic region have agreed on voluntary protection zones surrounding 
Spitsbergen (Svalbard archipelago). In accordance with a Greenpeace initiative, they 
agreed to stop industrial fishing in an era north of the 75 degree of latitude from the 
Barents Sea and the Greenland Sea all the way up to the North Pole, which is not 
scientifically studied yet. See Rudolf Hermann, Grenzen für die Arktis-Fischerei, in: 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 30 May 2016.  
132  Even the modest media coverage on these matters in Germany indicates that the 
search for raw materials is already under way: government sponsored maritime 
research, for example, takes place off the coasts of Tanzania and Mozambique, where 
estimated gas resources of 5.2 billion cubic meters could serve Germany for decades: 
See: Deutschland sucht Erdgas vor der ostafrikanischen Küste, in: Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 February 2014. 
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rumors, other parties to the Arctic Council also do not want to see the EU 
present there – including EU member states who are afraid of losing their 
own prerogative rights on the Arctic Council. Up until now, the EU bid for 
observer status is pending – another unfinished agenda to project the global 
role of Europe.133 
The projection of modern maritime power has been discussed in manifold 
ways since the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan.134 His analysis distinguished 
between sea powers and land powers, much in accordance with strategic 
thinking since the days of ancient Greece. In the 21st century, China defines 
the challenge with its combined land- and sea-strategy (“One Belt, One 
Road”). The EU is not badly equipped to develop its own combined land- 
and sea-strategy. As a land power it has developed into the largest single 
market on earth. 471 navigable ports in Europe have an annual turn-over of 
3.4 billion tons of cargo. 40 percent of all global commercial fleets – about 
83,000 vessels responsible for 90 percent of global trade transportation – are 
owned by Europeans.135 But as sea-power, the EU is still invisible. Freedom 
of navigation is not about the oceans alone. Maritime power in the 21st 
century includes the ability to protect the submarine cables, which enable the 
internet to work globally. Any sabotage of these cables could have disastrous 
effects for the global economy, and in fact the global society. A superficial 
look at the global map of submarine cables explains why France and Great 
Britain need to remain maritime military powers – and why they must be 
more actively supported by the European Union at large. 
  
 
133  See Duncan Depledge, The EU and the Arctic Council, in: European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 20 April 2015, online at: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/ 
commentary_the_eu_and_the_arctic_council3005. 
134  Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sea Power and World History. 1660-1783, Boston: Little 
Brown and Company, 1890. 
135  Data from European Commission, The EU Maritime Security Strategy – Fact sheet 
2017, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/ 
docs/body/eu-maritime-security-strategy-facts_en.pdf.  
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Map 5: Submarine cable map, Copyright: Greg’s Cable Map. OpenStreetMap 
contributors.   
Based on the EU Maritime Security Strategy, adopted in 2014 , the European 
Union has cautiously began to develop a comprehensive action plan to 
implement its emerging strategy.136 But the EU Maritime Security Strategy 
is definitely not strategic enough yet in the way it is being implemented. 
Moreover, as for now, the Overseas Countries and Territories associated with 
the EU do not play the role they deserve and demand.  
 
136  Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy, 
Brussels, 24 June 2014, online at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ 
doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT; Council of the European Union, 
European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) – Action Plan, Brussels, 16 
December 2014, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/ 
maritimeaffairs/files/docs/body/20141216-action-plan_en.pdf. 
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V.  The European archipelago: Transforming OCTs into 
the EU’s Outermost Regions  
The end of post-colonialism has not coincided with an all-out global 
dissemination of post-sovereignty orders. Region-building continues albeit 
not unchallenged. Among the relevant regional groupings around the world, 
the European Union is most advanced in terms of the supranational pooling 
of sovereignty. Inside the European Union, this innovative form of 
governance is coupled with an ongoing and solid, yet transformed reality of 
national sovereignty.  
French President Emmanuel Macron has risen to conceptual leadership with 
his call for the development of European sovereignty.137 The idea has to be 
developed further and it has to be implemented. European sovereignty differs 
from the traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty. It recognizes the 
permeability of sovereignty in a world in which autonomous decision-
making is mostly impossible for states and non-state entities in pursuing the 
ultimate, complete and unchallenged realization of their preferences. 
Interconnectedness and interdependence are new realities to be recognized 
when reflecting on an adequate notion of 21st century sovereignty. 
Gradualism is the new currency to define realism. Gradualism is also the new 
currency to define power in the 21st century. Absolute power, capable of 
imposing one’s will fully, completely and lastingly on others has become 
impossible. Subtle forms of sublime power projection must be added to the 
rigid concepts of hard power and soft power developed in international 
relations theory.  
Sublime power and sublime sovereignty – this is the formula to understand 
the European Union, the result of its evolution through gradualism. These 
experiences are all too often outnumbered by failure, detours – and new 
beginnings. In reality, its new post-sovereign sovereignty and post-power 
power makes the European Union innovative, and frustratingly difficult, 
 
137 Emmanuel Macron, Initiative pour l’ Europe – une Europe souveraine, unie, et 
démocratique, Paris, Sorbonne, 26 September 2017, online at: 
http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-
emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/.  
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often complicated and more often almost impossible to understand. And yet: 
since 1957, the processes and results of European integration have shown 
that this new model for governance and regulation, for statecraft and 
innovation can work – and continues to evolve. The EU has become a polity 
in its own right, a governance structure without government, and regulatory 
power based on rule of law and permanent political negotiation processes. 
138 
Striking the appropriate and acceptable balance between the different 
horizontal and vertical levels, organs and actors in the European Union 
remains at the heart of policy struggles in the European Union. It also 
constitutes the future evolution of European sovereignty. Other regional 
groupings have not yet matured to the EU level of balancing regional and 
national sovereignty. This current state of play does not preclude these 
groupings from advancing their search for best contingent ways to enhance 
the implementation of their regional preferences and commitments.139 At the 
same time, new and old geopolitical trends have emerged in recent years, 
confirming the continuous strength, if not dominance, of state-centered 
sovereignty in global affairs. The European Union remains internally and 
externally challenged by the need to formulate priorities: regressing to the 
primacy of national autarkic decision-making in the pursuit of autonomous 
state centeredness; balancing national sovereignty and shared EU regional 
 
138  In 1996, Thomas Risse-Kappen suggested to reverse the dominant theoretical 
perspective of understanding the EU primarily as a subject of studies in international 
relations, based on intergovernmental negotiation processes. Instead, the EU ought 
to be understood and studied as an element of comparative policy analysis: Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and 
Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union, in: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 1996, online at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1996.tb 
00560.x. In the meantime, it is time to re-balance the understanding of the EU as a 
subject of governance and policy studies with a fresh interpretation of a global EU 
as a subject of a transformed understanding of international relations. See also 
Christian Koenig/Bernhard von Wendland, The Art of Regulation. Competitiveness 
in Europe – Wealth and Wariness, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017; Christian 
Koenig/Ludger Kühnhardt (eds.), Governance and Regulation in the European 
Union. A Reader, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017.    
139  See Ludger Kühnhardt, Region-Building, vol. II: Regional Integration in the World: 
Documents, Oxford/New York: Berghahn Books, 2010. 
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sovereignty, based on continuously diverse positions among EU member 
states. One of the avenues as to what might make more sense is a pragmatic, 
thematic approach to define the balance between the national and the 
regional level. It should be assumed that this struggle will continue, in terms 
of concepts, power ambitions and legitimacy matters in the face of an ever 
more incoherent European society.  
This situation has implications for the future of the European overseas 
countries and territories. The age of decolonization has not seen these 
territories achieving or wanting to achieve sovereign statehood. The 
arrangement of semi-sovereignty they found with the states, which 
dominated them as colonial powers for a long time, remains incoherent: they 
receive aid and subsidies in return for rejecting full-fledged sovereignty 
ambitions. From the perspective of the EU member states they belong to, the 
situation is of a reverse logic: They regain control and have to pay for it 
without explicitly defining mutual interests and shared commitments. In 
recent times France and the Netherlands have demanded their OCTs take 
over more responsibility and ownership – along the line of arguments all aid-
recipient developing countries are facing. The ownership argument is also 
used by Denmark in regard to demanding better societal efforts in health 
care, education and job promotion from Greenland in return for continuous 
Danish (and strong EU) subsidies.  
The arguments remain twisted and spectacularly dishonest in both directions. 
While France, the Netherlands and Denmark know that their OCTs cannot 
live on the basis of fully independent statehood, they have no leverage in 
reducing financial subsidies or economic benefits without facing the 
traditional blame-games of dishonesty and arrogance, of pseudo-colonial 
neglect. OCTs in turn, know that independence is no real option for them as 
long as they receive better financial support and economic conditions than 
otherwise. They may blame the countries they belong to of human, social 
and political neglect, but they know that the best option for them is to 
continue the way things have developed. Under new geopolitical 
constellations, a window of opportunity has opened to reshape the content 
and enhance the benefits they gain from being semi-sovereign. Until now, 
by and large OCTs face the classical development trap. The time has come 
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for a structural and strategic overhaul of this trap. The issue is particularly 
sensitive with regard to New Caledonia (where the independence movement 
still is strong), to French Polynesia (where the Mururoa legacy is still alive), 
to Wallis et Futuna (where local kingdoms prevail outside the French 
administration with a strong sense of identity) and to Greenland (where the 
trauma of leaving the EEC has not been fully overcome). More than other 
OCTs, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis et Futuna and Greenland 
insist on their precious and wide-ranging autonomy. And yet, the regular 
paycheck from the European Union is warmly welcomed in all these 
places.140 In the end, it does not work to have the cake and eat it, too. To 
convincingly argue for the reciprocal strategic usefulness of enhancing 
relations of New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis et Futuna and of 
Greenland with the European Union, the economic benefit for New 
Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis et Futuna and for Greenland must 
become evident while their respective sense of ownership is strengthened, 
too. Further economic benefits could indeed be facilitated by upgrading the 
OCT status and rebranding all OCTs “Outermost Regions of the EU”. 
In the end, it might be more difficult to convince France and Denmark – 
which also could benefit from the EU-wide burden-sharing attached to a 
status change from OCT to Outermost Region – than New Caledonia, French 
Polynesia, Wallis et Futuna and Greenland. Certainly, the matter requires 
greater sensitivity in these cases than in relation with any other OCT. But: 
nowhere else – beside the British overseas territories in the South Atlantic – 
is the rebranding and upgrading of status strategically more important for the 
EU as a whole.  
The OCTs, which are associated with the European Union via the countries 
they belong to, without being fully integrated into their legal and political 
order, differ in the arrangements they have established with the countries 
they belong to. Surprisingly, the arrangements the OCTs maintain with the 
 
140  European Commission, Directorate-General for International Cooperation and 
Development, European Union reaffirms its commitment to a strong partnership with 
Greenland, Brussels, 20 July 2018, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-
and-events/european-union-reaffirms-its-commitment-its-strong-partnership-
greenland_en.  
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European Union as a whole are rather standardized and coherent. This is all 
the more important as the interest in overseas countries and territories is not 
widely spread beyond the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and 
Denmark – and even their interest is limited to experts and a few actors. As 
for most other EU member states, the paradox continues for now: They co-
finance OCTs without having a say in the role they play. They embrace the 
interests of those member states, which maintain overseas territories without 
really looking at them or trying to shape them. If at all, most EU member 
states support OCTs without engaging beyond the multi-annual overhaul of 
the EU Overseas Association Decision.  
It cannot come as a surprise that this situation does not favor strategic 
foresight. While in principle, France is open to a strategic projection of its 
full power potential, Germany remains a reluctant partner – often even 
remaining parochial in the study of wider global affairs.141 On the other hand, 
EU member states who maintain overseas territories have lost the ability to 
independently finance their ambition of strategic autonomy and global 
presence. The need to stabilize and enhance strategic autonomy and global 
presence requires them to cooperate with others via the EU as a whole.  
OCTs cannot become independent and thrive as single nation-states. Even in 
the case of Greenland, speculation assumes that the proper management of 
an independent state might take fifty years or so. Experience shows that 
people might favor poverty over what they perceive as dependency. But in 
line with global trends for the past two-hundred years, those who still doubt 
eventually need to decide. It is the EU which could enhance its own leverage 
in this gamble of post-colonial traps by genuinely recognizing and 
empowering the strategic relevance of its OCTs, Greenland in particular. Is 
it so far-fetched to envisage an Arctic future in which EU civil-military 
surveillance systems could be stationed in Greenland with the consent of and 
beneficial to the Inuit population? The benefits of being recognized as an EU 
 
141  As long as this situation prevails, it cannot come as a surprise that French military 
leaders question German strategic credibility and refuse to share the French national 
atomic dissuasion („force de frappe“) with Germany or the EU at large. See Michaela 
Wiegel, Frankreich will Atomstreitkraft nicht teilen, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 14 February 2019.  
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Outermost Region might gradually evolve even in integration-skeptical 
Greenland.  
The current undecidedness over semi-sovereignty needs to be overtaken by 
the insight in Greenland that it is suboptimal to guaranteeing a stable future; 
and for the EU that it is suboptimal to achieve EU interests in a 
comprehensive way without graduating OCTs. The insight has to grow on 
both sides that the concept of European sovereignty is beneficial for both if 
it were to apply to the OCTs, too. The post-Brexit overseas countries and 
territories of the European Union are not a relic of the European colonial 
past. They are rather important pieces in the puzzle that will define the global 
future of the European Union.  
For the EU as a whole, it is particularly untimely that Germany is not better 
prepared and visible in the debate on the future of OCTs. The German deficit 
in strategic thinking, often lamented, is quite evident as far as interest in, 
knowledge of and conceptual reflection about OCTs is concerned. At best, 
OCTs are a matter of tourism interest in the media; so it seems, when 
considering the only article published in a national newspaper on the 
graduation of Mayotte to becoming a French département and hence an 
integral part of the EU in 2011.142 Beyond this, it remains difficult to find 
German publications on OCTs, let alone their strategic relevance for the EU. 
Germany is in urgent need to discover the maritime dimension of the 
European Union in all its strategic aspects, beyond ecological and civilian 
ones.   
Time has come to upgrade the overseas countries and territories in their 
relevance of and status toward and within the European Union. This is a most 
urgent matter if the ambition of simplifying EU instruments shall be 
completed. It is even more urgent if considered through the prism of long-
 
142 Markus Schönherr, Ab dem 1. Januar hat die EU ein Inselparadies, in: Die Welt, 30 
December 2013, online: https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article123385184/ Ab-
dem-1-Januar-hat-die-EU-ein-Inselparadies.html; see also a superficial overview 
defined by the same mind-set: Europa in Übersee – hier genügt noch der 
Personalausweis, in: Die Welt, 22 February 2015, online: https://www.welt.de/ 
print/wams/reise/article137697197/Europa-in-Uebersee-hier-genuegt-noch-der-
Personalausweis.html.    
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term strategic interests of the EU. The upgrading of the OCTs will be 
reinforced by way of empowering the maritime-related agenda in EU policy 
discourses. But the future of the EU-OCT relationship has to go beyond 
functional thematic cooperation. A structural graduation of the Overseas 
Countries and Territories associated with the European Union has to bring 
the OCTs closer toward EU policy making and strategizing out of 
enlightened EU self-interest. The arguments developed in this paper support 
the idea of upgrading the relationship of the OCTs to that of Outermost 
Regions – the current status of the Canary Islands (population 2,135,722), of 
Madeira (population 256,424) and the Azores (population 245,766), of the 
French overseas collectivity Saint-Martin (population 35,684), and France’s 
départements Guiana (population 262,527), Guadeloupe (population 
393,392) and Martinique (population 376,847) in the Caribbean, La Réunion 
(population 850,996) and Mayotte (population 235,132) in the Indian 
Ocean.143 Outermost Regions enjoy a myriad of derogations from EU law. 
But nobody is in doubt that they belong as much to the European Union as 
any place between Lisbon and Helsinki. Outermost Regions of the EU 
qualify for support from the EU cohesion fund, the fund for regional 
development and the European social fund. Their citizens can vote in the 
elections to the European Parliament. In principle, the Outermost Regions 
are integral parts of the European Union with full application of the acquis 
communautaire. In reality, their status as far as the EU customs territory, 
trade regulation and passport rules (Schengen) are concerned, varies from 
place to place. This flexibility underlines that Outermost Regions are 
strongly benefitting from the overall EU solidarity concept. Outermost 
 
143  Outermost Regions are governed in the EU on the basis or Article 349 and Article 
355 of the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU), online at: http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-
lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-
7-general-and-final-provisions/592-article-349.html. On their actorness see 
European Parliament. Think Tank, Outermost Regions of the EU: A stronger and 
renewed partnership, January 19, 2018, online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282018%29614669; European 
Committee of the Regions, Outermost Regions are a land of opportunities for the 
European Union, 15 April 2018, online at: https://cor.europa.eu/en/ 
news/Pages/outermost-regions-are-a-land-of-opportunities-for-the-european-
union.aspx.   
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Regions, in other words, play a strategic role for the EU while at the same 
time they benefit from diverse commitments by the EU.  
Outermost Regions matter for the EU as a whole and not only for the country 
they belong to. This formula might be a good perspective for overseas 
countries and territories of the European Union, too. 144  As much as 
Outermost Regions, the Overseas Countries and Territories could benefit 
from a coherent EU policy in support of their specific interests and 
derogations from EU law. A rebranded grouping consisting of all current 
Outermost Regions and all – or at least most – current Overseas Countries 
and Territories would definitely enhance the strategic significance of the 
overseas for the EU.  
Together, European Outermost Regions and OCTs are home to 5.9 million 
EU-citizens (without Brexit) / 5.7 million EU citizens (post-Brexit). This 
figure is practically equivalent to the population of Denmark (5.77 million.), 
more than the population of Finland (5.5 million) or Slovakia (5.4 million.) 
and more than the five smallest EU member states (Malta, Luxemburg, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia) together.145   
 
144  This formular clearly leaves all necessary space for the respective EU member states 
to pursue a differentiated internal constitutional relationship with their respective 
OCTs. France’s overseas territories are organised as follows: Overseas departments 
and regions (département et régions d’outre-mer): Guadeloupe (since 1946); French 
Guiana (since 1946); Martinique (since 1946); La Réunion (since 1946); Mayotte 
(since 2011); Overseas collectivities (collectivité d’outre-mer/COM): St. Pierre et 
Miquelon (since 2003), Wallis et Futuna (since 2003), Saint-Martin (since 2007), 
St.Barthélemy (since 2007); Overseas country (pays d’outre-mer): French Polynesia 
(since 2004); Overseas territory: French Southern and Antarctic Lands (Terres 
Australes et Antarctiques Françaises or TAAF, since 1956; since 2007, the Scattered 
Islands in the Indian Ocean constitute the 5th district of TAAF), Overseas territory 
sui generis: New Caledonia (since 1999); state private property: Clipperton Island 
(since 2007). In the case of the Netherlands, overseas territories are organized as 
follows: Autonomous countries (landen): Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten (since 
2010); special municipalities (bijzondere gemeenten) or in legal terms: public bodies 
(openbare lichamen): Saba, St. Eustatius, Bonaire (since 2010). The overseas 
territories of the Realm of Denmark are self-governing autonomous constituent 
countries: Faroe Islands (since 1948) and Greenland (since 1979).    
145  Outermost Regions account for 4,793,363 inhabitants, overseas countries and 
territories account for 913,224 inhabitants (without Brexit: plus 213,159) which adds 
to a total of 5,706,587 inhabitants (without Brexit: plus 213,159 inhabitants of British 
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Funds allocated to Outermost Regions (2014-2020) Euro 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), including special 
allocations for Outermost Regions and for European Territorial 
Cooperation (ETC) 
5 billion 
European Social Fund (ESF), including Youth Employment 
Initiative (YEI) 
1.9 billion 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) 1.5 billion 
Program of Options Specifically Relating to Remoteness and 
Insularity (POSEI) programs, funded from the European 
Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) 
4.6 billion 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) 0.3 billion 
Total 13.3 billion 
Table 2: Sixth European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds allocated to the 
Outermost Regions of the European Union (2014-2020)146. 
Opting-in could therefore be a welcome opportunity for some OCTs to 
upgrade their visibility and relevance. It is worth comparing the different 
effects of OCTs and Outermost Regions of the EU have with regard to EU 
policies toward their respective neighbors. One of the benefits French 
Guiana has gained from its integral inclusion into the EU as a French 
département – and the EU has gained from incorporating French Guiana as 
an outermost territory – is the trade potential which has been generated with 
the construction of the Oyapock River Bridge connecting the département 
(and thus the EU) with Brazil. This infrastructure upgrading supports 
broadened regional perspectives. 147  On the other hand, the non-EU 
incorporated overseas territory Saint-Pierre et Miquelon in the North 
 
OCTs – total 1,126,383 inhabitants in OCTs, total with Outermost Regions: 
5,919,746 inhabitants). For details see European Parliament, Fact Sheets of the 
European Union. Outermost Regions, online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
factsheets/en/sheet/100/outermost-regions-ors; Association of the Overseas 
Countries and Territories of the European Union (OCTA), The OCTs, op. cit. 
146  European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union. Outermost Regions, 
online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/100/outermost-regions-
ors-.  
147  See David E. Lewis/Henry MacDonald/Jean-Yves Lacascade, The Guiana Shield: A 
Zone of Southern Caribbean Integration and Sustainable Development, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 28 November 2017, online at: 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/guiana-shield.  
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Atlantic was explicitly excluded from benefitting from the free trade 
agreement between the European Union and Canada, provisionally entering 
into force in September 2017. The status of an Outermost Region, 
incorporated into the EU customs union, would have been more beneficial 
for St. Pierre et Miquelon which is currently considered a third country by 
the CETA trade agreement.148 Paradoxically and in spite of French lobbying, 
the widely acclaimed CETA agreement does not facilitate access to the 
Canadian market for its most immediate neighboring European territory, St. 
Pierre et Miquelon.149 On monetary matters, win-win situations are feasible 
once OCTs were upgraded to the status of Outermost Regions. The debate 
on introducing the euro in New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis et 
Futuna, has a certain unsatisfactory history.150  Citizen rights and voting 
rights without monetary rights is an odd combination indeed. Dutch OCTs 
are also outside the Eurozone, although the euro is the widely used currency 
there. In order to strengthen the euro as “the face and the instrument of a 
new, more sovereign Europe” – as EU Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker said in his State of the Union Address 2018151 – the euro introduction 
in all EU overseas countries and territories should happen sooner rather than 
later. Only those territories which prefer to stay outside the Eurozone would 
be granted the opt-out right already applying to Denmark.  
 
148  Regulations defining EU or other CETA beneficiaries, in: Canada Gazette, part I, 
vol. 151, no. 28, p. 3220, online at: http://www.lexsage.com/ documents/Regulations 
%20Defining%20EU%20Country%20or%20other%20CETA%20Beneficiary.pdf. 
149  See Jean-Marie Paugam, Impact de l’Accord Economique et Commercial Global 
(AECG) Union Européenne – Canada Sur l’économie de Saint- Pierre et Miquelon. 
Rapport de Mission, Paris: Direction Générale du Trésor, 2017, online at: 
https://www.iedom.fr/IMG/pdf/rapport_de_mission_paugam.pdf.  
150 See Bernard Poirine, Will the EU and the euro lead to more sovereignty? French 
Polynesia, in: Rebecca Adler-Nissen/Ulrik Pram Gad (eds.), European Integration 
and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games. The EU Overseas Countries and Territories, 
op. cit., pp.152-168; Peter Brown, Negotiating postcolonial identities in the shadow 
of the EU. New Caledonia, ibid., pp. 169-186.  
151 Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union 2018. The hour of European sovereignty, 
Brussels, 12 September 2018, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta- 
 political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf. 
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Beyond the currency matter, the key to advancing the debate about future 
relations with the EU in Greenland and the Faroe Islands rests in the 
comprehensive recognition of the Arctic dimension by the EU. Labelling 
Greenland “strategic” is correct but does not go far enough. Recognizing that 
identity and security, autonomy and sovereignty will be better served from 
within instead of remaining on the sidelines of association will remain a 
daunting matter in the North Atlantic. The EU needs to become much more 
pro-active and demonstrate convincingly which benefits a graduation from 
the OCT status to that of an Outermost Region with strong autonomy rights, 
could effectively bring. Avenues of cooperation in maritime matters also 
need to overcome the geographical North-South divide in the Atlantic: Even 
before the Brexit referendum sent shock waves through the Atlantic, 
cooperation between Saint Helena and Greenland on biodiversity and ocean 
sustainability matters has not been possible under the existing OCT 
association regime. Traditional geographical regions were always closed 
bureaucratic boxes as far as the provision of EU funds is concerned. Should 
the term “strategic” genuinely mean for the EU what it implies, with or 
without Brexit, this cannot continue to be the case for European North-South 
cooperation in the Atlantic. Moreover, wide-ranging opting-out clauses and 
precise derogations might facilitate deliberations with Greenland on 
upgrading the association status to an EU Outermost Region without 
returning to full EU membership. The OCTs are a showcase for applying the 
EU principle of enhanced cooperation152 in creative new ways. 
OCTs operating as EU Outermost Regions cannot produce more 
bureaucratic red tape than is the case already today without having the same 
status as Outermost Regions. Some bottlenecks would even disappear: Since 
the beginning of the planning period in 2014, the French Outermost Region 
Saint-Martin and the Dutch OCT Sint Maarten have failed to implement a 
common sewage plant on the Caribbean island shared by the two of them. 
The money for the Cole Bay Sewage Treatment Plant was earmarked under 
the rubric of regional funds for Saint-Martin, and under the rubric of the 
European Development Fund for Sint Maarten. Eventually, it was not EU 
 
152  Treaty of Lisbon, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Articles 326-
334. 
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money from two different budgets but only the devastating shock of 
hurricane Irma in 2017, which accelerated idiosyncratic planning processes: 
However, getting the sewage system in place before the end of the fiscal 
period in 2021 is still a matter of hope at the time of writing this paper.  
Surprisingly, the opportunities of Franco-German maritime cooperation 
materialize outside the EU: On Svalbard (Spitsbergen), in the strategic 
Arctic, the joint Franco-German research station AWIPEV operates since 
2003. This cooperation in Ny-Ålesund, the first non-Norwegian research of 
its kind on Svalbard, is plausible and meaningful. The scientific interests of 
Norway overlap in substantial ways with the EU Arctic agenda. This agenda 
in turn is not different from national interests of France and Germany.153 
With this Arctic strategy and the implementing “communication” of 2016 
the EU “is putting a soft footprint in the Arctic snow” as EU Commissioner 
Karmenu Vella has nicely described the current dominant ambition of the 
EU. 154  He emphasized the development of “innovative cold-climate 
technologies, …farmed fish techniques for the Arctic region and clean 
energy advances” as the core of the EU’s strategic approach to Arctic 
matters.155 In his view it is this “commitment in the Arctic to cooperation 
that brings safety, sustainability and prosperity to the Arctic”.156  
In accordance with this civilian and quintessentially non-conflicting 
approach, the EU has become signatory to the treaty signed on October 3, 
2018 by nine states and the EU. The European Commission is considers the 
treaty “a landmark international agreement to prevent unregulated 
 
153  European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. 
An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic, 27 April 2016, online at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/arctic_region/docs/160427_joint-
communication -an-integrated-european-union-policy-for-the-arctic_en.pdf. 
154  Karmenu Vella, Arctic Press Conference, in: European Commission. Commission 
and its priorities, Brussels, 27 April 2016, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vella/announcements/Arctic-press- 
 conference_en. 
155  Ibid. 
156  Ibid.   
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commercial fishing in the Arctic high seas”. 157  This statement is 
unequivocal. Yet, the EU still falls short of recognizing the geopolitical 
dimension of current arctic developments beyond climate change, 
sustainability and matters of naval navigation.158 The Norwegian host nation 
of the Franco-German research station AWIPEV show the way: The 
University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS) has broadened its scientific 
perspective beyond biology, marine geology and physics: UNIS, the most 
advanced research and study institute on Arctic matters is offering courses 
on Arctic safety, too. As of the academic year 2019/2020, the UNIS profile 
is complemented by a new study program on Arctic shipping, recognizing 
the logistical as well as the legal and geopolitical dimension of the Arctic 
Ocean.159  
Over the past decade, the European Union has made noticeable progress in 
linking its global economic interests with the fight against piracy, a serious 
problem affecting European maritime trading interests. Piracy has caused 
economic losses measured in billions of dollars per year, for a long time this 
primarily occurred in the region of the Horn of Africa. In the meantime, the 
main concern has shifted to the Gulf of Guinea, where piracy, drug 
smuggling and massive proliferation of small weapons are going hand in 
hand. Gradually, the EU maritime security strategy has been broadened to 
address the complex anti-piracy agenda holistically.160  
 
157  European Commission, Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, EU 
and Arctic partners enter historic agreement to prevent unregulated fishing in high 
seas, Brussels, 3 October 2018, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/eu-and-
arctic-partners-enter-historic-agreement-prevent-unregulated-fishing-high-seas_en.  
158  See Margaret Blunden, Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route, in: International 
affairs, vol. 88/1 (2012), pp. 1115-129, online at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ 
doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01060.x . 
159 For further details see the webpage of UNIS: https://www.unis.no/.  
160  For an early wake-up call see Hella Engerer, Piraterie und maritimer Terrorismus. 
Entwicklung und Bedeutung des Seehandels, PiraT-Arbeitspapiere zur Maritimen 
Sicherheit Nr. 3, Hamburg: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an 
der Universität Hamburg, 2011, online at: http://www.maritimesecurity.eu/ 
de/publikationen/workingpapers.html. 
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And yet: The European Union remains in urgent need to fully strategize its 
global maritime policy. Overseas Countries and Territories cannot be 
neglected any longer as an important element in this strategy. They must 
graduate to become more relevant to EU-wide discourses and decision-
making. An adequate approach will always leave room for practical 
derogations and pragmatic adjustments. While today, an upgrading and 
rebranding of the OCTs is desirable, it shall be noted that in the past the 
opposite also happened in the spirit of good-will and principled pragmatism: 
A swap from being an Outermost Region fully integrated into the European 
legal acquis communautaire to the status of an associated OCT with less 
obligations under EU law. St. Barthélemy paved the way, demonstrating that 
flexibility is possible under the French constitution.  
Under new geopolitical circumstances, flexibility must also be defined in the 
opposite direction, by granting OCTs greater visibility and actorness in the 
wider EU world. Such flexibility is certainly feasible under the umbrella of 
the European Union, the embodiment of a genuine European form of 
federalism. As a first pragmatic step, a permanent EU delegation should be 
established in each OCT. Constitutional provisions based on institutional 
arrangements require a priority shift toward a thematic-centered 
constitutionalism, meaning that themes and not institutional arrangements as 
such define constitutional status, loyalty and scope of autonomy. Graduating 
OCTs to the status of EU Outermost Regions would represent such a – 
necessary and far-sighted – spatial turn.  
The consequence of this turn would give life, meaning and flexible 
development potential to the European archipelago. National prerogatives of 
France, the Netherlands and Denmark ought not to be hampered. Likewise, 
autonomous aspirations of any Outermost Region – e. g. Greenland or New 
Caledonia – will remain possible. But EU foreign policy cohesion would 
receive an enormous boost should the OCT status be upgraded. European 
sovereignty would gain a new exemplification. European legitimacy, too, 
would be enhanced: Decision-making on the distribution of finances 
reserved for the Outermost Regions in the EU budget would be balanced by 
the involvement of all relevant EU organs in decision-making and 
strategizing. The future EU Global Strategy would be empowered and 
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perceived as one also addressing the role and relevance of the European 
archipelago. Rebranding the status of OCTs would be a win-win-situation: 
OCTs would gain assurances of long-term EU solidarity; the countries of 
which they are constitutional parts would gain consolidated and sustainable 
financial and strategic support from all other countries within the EU; EU 
member states supporting OCTs financially already now would enhance 
their voice and influence in decision-making in OCT affairs. 
Institutionally, OCTs as Outermost Regions can be dealt with in 
geographical, thematic and cross-cutting matters under the roof of the 
respective Directorates-General, especially the Directorate-General for 
Internal Affairs (rather than the Directorate-General for International 
Cooperation and Development), the Directorate-General for Urban and 
Regional Policies, the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (to use the 
terminology of the Juncker Commission 2014-2019). Appropriate links to 
the European External Action Service would guarantee the embeddedness of 
OCT matters into wider foreign and security policies. The euro could, in 
principle, be introduced in all OCTs while their citizens would gain the right 
of voting in the elections to the European Parliament. Under current 
conditions, security and defense matters will continue to be handled by 
France, the Netherlands and Denmark, while the application of the EU 
solidarity clause should be reconfirmed as an additional sign of support. It 
would send a clear message to any country in the nearer or wider 
neighborhood of EU Overseas Countries and Territories. In sum: OCTs as 
EU Outermost Regions would become part of the European domestic policy 
instead of remaining marginalized as an appendix to the EU’s international 
cooperation and development agenda. The EU would be able to make much 
better use of its sublime global power. 
The main obstacles may not come from the OCTs but from within the EU: 
Germany, a continental power, will remain reluctant to overcome its land-
oriented view on geopolitics. Although Germany has strong economic 
interests and a strong technological and ecological presence related to the 
global maritime agenda, Germany is likely to remain the reluctant strategist 
in maritime matters. France, a global power, might find it difficult to fully 
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translate its national security paradigm into a shared aspect of European 
sovereignty. The universal vocation of French political identity has to be 
balanced with the ongoing domestic primacy favoring national security 
sovereignty. Other EU member states tend to consider any focus on overseas 
territories a possible threat to their own interests in advancing their 
respective negotiation gains on internal EU (financial and other) matters. To 
overcome absolute positions, pragmatism is needed for the European Union. 
Given all experience with EU developments, only gradual progress is likely 
in rebranding Overseas Countries and Territories. The need to embark on 
this journey of persuasion is obvious.  
The status of OCTs has to be graduated to become compatible with the 
realities they represent and the importance they have for a coherent global 
role of Europe. Rebranded “Outermost Regions of the EU”, the current 
Overseas Countries and Territories would contribute much better to a 
simplified and hence to a stronger global presence of the European Union. 
Graduating the OCTs will require a revision of the Lisbon Treaty. This paper 
has provided arguments why and how to do so. 161 
 
 
161 The text was finalized in September 2019, before the Brexit conundrum was resolved 
and prior to the final decision on the new EU Overseas Association Decision. 
Das Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) ist ein interdisziplinäres 
Forschungs- und Weiterbildungsinstitut der Universität Bonn. ZEI – DISCUSSION PAPER richten 
sich mit ihren von Wissenschaftlern und politischen Akteuren verfassten Beiträgen an 
Wissenschaft, Politik und Publizistik. Sie geben die persönliche Meinung der Autoren wieder. Die 
Beiträge fassen häufig Ergebnisse aus laufenden Forschungsprojekten des ZEI zusammen.  
 
The Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) is an interdisciplinary research and further 
education institute at the University of Bonn. ZEI – DISCUSSION PAPER are intended to stimulate 
discussion among researchers, practitioners and policy makers on current and emerging issues 
of European integration and Europe´s global role. They express the personal opinion of the 
authors. The papers often reflect on-going research projects at ZEI.  
 
Die neuesten ZEI Discussion Paper / Most recent ZEI Discussion Paper: 
 
C 241 (2017) Robert Stüwe 
EU External Energy Policy in Natural Gas: A Case of Neofunctionalist Integration? 
C 242 (2017) Ludger Kühnhardt 
Weltfähig werden. Die Europäische Union nach dem Biedermeier 
C 243 (2017) César Castilla 
Perspectives on EU-Latin American Cooperation: Enhancing Governance, Human 
Mobility and Security Policies 
C 244 (2017) 
 
Joe Borg 
The Maltese Presidency of the European Union 2017 
C 245 (2018) Ludger Kühnhardt 
The New Silk Road: The European Union, China and Lessons Learned 
C 246 (2018) Teodora Lađić 
The Impact of European Integration on the Westphalian Concept of National 
Sovereignty 
C 247 (2018) Wolfgang Reinhard 
Die Expansivität Europas und ihre Folgen 
C 248 (2018) Joseph M. Hughes 
“Sleeping Beauty” Unleashed: Harmonizing a Consolidated European Security and 
Defence Union  
C 249 (2018) Rahel Hutgens/Stephan Conermann 
Macron’s Idea of European Universities. From Vision to Reality 
C 250 (2018) Javier González López 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: a Case Study for the Unfinished EU Agenda in the 
Western Balkans 
C 251 (2019) Günther H. Oettinger 
Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit 
Michael Gehler 
C 252 (2019) Chiara Ristuccia 
Industry 4.0: SMEs Challenges and Opportunities in the Era of Digitalization 
C 253 (2019) Agnes Kasper/Alexander Antonov 
Towards Conceptualizing EU Cybersecurity Law 
C 254 (2019) Susanne Baier-Allen 
Europe and America 
C 255 (2019) Ludger Kühnhardt  
The European Archipelago. Rebranding the Strategic Significance of EU Overseas 
Countries and Territories 
 
Die vollständige Liste seit 1998 und alle Discussion Paper zum Download finden Sie auf unserer 
Homepage: http://www.zei.de. For a complete list since 1998 and all Discussion Paper for 
download, see the center‘s homepage: http://www.zei.de. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
